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In recent years the Supreme Court has held that peremptory 
challenges based upon race1 or sex,2 and possibly ethnicity,3 violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.4  The Court has yet to decide whether 
religion-related peremptories also are invalid, although a number of 
lower courts have struggled with the question and reached conflicting 
conclusions.5  Sooner or later the Court will have to deal with the 
question, and in doing so it will discover that its task is more difficult 
 
 ∗ John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
 1 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 2 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 3 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 
528 U.S. 304, 315 (2000) (citing Hernandez as involving “ethnic origin”).  But see 
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143 n.16 (suggesting Hernandez concerned race).  See also Rico v. 
Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 182-84 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that it was not 
objectively unreasonable to apply Batson to peremptory strikes of Italian-Americans, 
but affirming the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s finding that the prosecutor’s strikes 
were not motivated solely by prospective jurors’ Italian-American heritage); cf. 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (implying alterable physical 
characteristic—in this case long, unkempt hair and beard, suggesting  lifestyle—was 
not a forbidden basis for peremptory challenge). 
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 5 A number of courts have held that peremptories based on religion do not 
violate the Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. 
denied, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (allowing a peremptory challenge based on juror’s 
being Jehovah’s Witness and going to church three times a week, and prosecutor’s 
experience that Jehovah’s Witnesses were reluctant to exercise authority over 
others); Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) 
(holding that peremptory challenges based on jurors’ being members of Pentecostal 
Church did not violate the Constitution). 
Other courts have held that peremptories based on religion do violate the 
Constitution.  See, e.g., State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 550-56 (Conn.), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 969 (1999) (holding that peremptories based on “religious affiliation” violate 
Equal Protection Clause, but noting that the challenge in question had a different 
basis). 
For citations to numerous other decisions on religion-related peremptories, see 
Suzanne Bell Chambers, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 70 
IND. L.J. 569, 585 n.122 (1995); and Susan Hightower, Note, Sex and the Peremptory 
Strike: An Empirical Analysis of J.E.B. v. Alabama’s First Five Years, 52 STAN. L. REV. 895, 
901-03 (2000). 
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than in cases involving race and sex, for in addition to applying equal 
protection doctrine and the “impartial jury” guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment,6 it will have to take into account the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment.7 
I. JURY SELECTION AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES GENERALLY 
In order to evaluate the arguments for and against the 
constitutionality of peremptory challenges relating to religion, it is 
necessary first briefly to survey generally the subject of jury selection, 
including the principles that govern the formation of the venire and 
challenges for cause, as well as peremptory challenges.  Only with this 
wide focus will it be possible to appreciate the special questions 
presented by the application of the Religion Clauses to the use of 
peremptory challenges. 
If trial by jury is employed in the prosecution of crime, which 
constitutionally it must be if the prosecution is for more than a petty 
offense,8 the jury must be randomly selected from a venire that is a 
fair cross-section of the population.  The requirement that the venire 
be a fair cross-section is found in the Sixth Amendment’s provision 
that a criminal defendant is entitled to trial by an “impartial jury.”9  
The Supreme Court has said that “jury wheels, pools of names, 
panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically 
exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be 
reasonably representative thereof.”10  It may not matter for present 
purposes whether the Court means to lay down an absolute right to a 
fair cross-section in each and every venire, or only that a departure 
from the fair cross-section must not be intentional.11 
 
 6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
 7 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 8 Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). 
 9 The present discussion is confined to criminal cases, and therefore I refer only 
to the Sixth Amendment.  The Seventh Amendment also provides for “the right of 
trial by jury,” U.S. CONST. amend. VII, but this requirement has not been applied to 
the states.  See Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973).  Article III, § 2, cl. 3 of the 
original Constitution requires that in federal courts “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except 
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 10 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 
U.S. 357, 366 (1979). 
 11 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory 
Challenges and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 184-85 (1989) 
(examining the difference between “systematic” and “purposeful” exclusion); Joanna 
Sobol, Note, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment of the “Fair 
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What makes a venire a fair cross-section for Sixth Amendment 
purposes is that it be composed of representatives of “cognizable 
groups” in numbers proportional to their numbers in the population.  
“Cognizable groups” are groups that have shared beliefs about the 
way the world works—beliefs about facts—or shared beliefs about 
how the world ought to work—beliefs about the good or values.  In 
addition, for a group to be “cognizable” for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, it must be of a certain size.12  In regard to factual beliefs, if 
the group that holds these beliefs is very small, the beliefs, if they are 
to affect the outcome of litigation, must be introduced through the 
formal trial process of sworn and cross-examined witnesses, 
authenticated documents and so on, and not through the informal 
process of “jury notice,” i.e., the jurors simply taking into account 
what they think they already know.  The requirement that a group be 
of a certain size to be cognizable is based upon the need of fair notice 
to the parties of the basis upon which the verdict will rest, and reflects 
the weakness of the political claims of small groups in the society, 
under the fundamental constitutional philosophy, to have their 
beliefs automatically taken into account.13  In regard to beliefs about 
the good, it may be that there is no way for a small group to influence 
the outcomes of a jury system.  A small belief group is not a 
“cognizable group,” entitled to representation on the venire with a 
consequent chance to be included in the petty jury, and so to 
influence the verdict through the informal process, nor is it entitled 
to put its beliefs about the good before the jury through the formal 
process.  The jury generally will receive the law from the judge, a law 
that usually will reflect the values of large or at least mid-size groups 
in the population, whether it has been enacted by the legislature or 
created by the courts.  In the limited instances in which the jury is 
given the task of deciding what is good and not simply what 
occurred—e.g., whether conduct was negligent, or in certain criminal 
cases, what the punishment should be—evidence ordinarily will not 
be received on questions of value.  If small belief groups, so far as 
values are concerned, are to affect the outcomes of cases tried to 
juries, they must become large groups, so that they can influence the 
content of the law enacted by the legislature or announced by the 
judges, or so that they can be recognized as “cognizable groups” 
entitled to representation on venires with a chance for their members 
 
Cross-Section of the Community”, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 195-96 (1995) (discussing 
“systematic exclusion”). 
 12 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 134 (requiring “identifiable segments playing major roles 
in the community”); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. 
 13 See John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395, 399-401 (1985). 
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to be on petty juries. 
Challenges “for cause” assure that there are not on the petty jury 
representatives of groups that are noncognizable in regard either to 
facts or to values, or at least that there are not on the jury 
representatives of such groups who present more than a certain risk 
that they will resort to impermissible beliefs.  Challenges for cause 
may be seen as not in conflict with the fair cross-section requirement 
of the Sixth Amendment, but a means for enforcing it, at least 
assuming a certain standard for “cause.”  Thus, to say that a 
defendant has a right to a petty jury that is randomly drawn from a 
fair cross-section of the population, properly understood, means that 
the petty jury is randomly drawn from a fair cross-section of 
cognizable groups, that is to say from the qualified population.  
“Cognizable groups” does not include small belief groups, persons 
under a certain age, or persons who lack a certain physical and 
intellectual capacity.  It does not matter whether the unqualified are 
excluded at the threshold of the selection process, at a later stage, or 
when the petty jury is finally chosen from the venire.  The method 
that is used may affect whether a particular individual sits on a jury, 
but it will not affect the representation of cognizable groups. 
The foregoing analysis sees the Sixth Amendment’s “impartial 
jury” guarantee as containing a single requirement of random 
selection from a fair cross-section of cognizable groups, so that 
challenges for cause simply enforce that single requirement.  An 
alternative view is that the requirement of an “impartial jury” contains 
two norms, the first being the requirement of random selection from 
a fair cross-section, the second, that no one sit on a petty jury whose 
presence creates a significant risk that the verdict will depend upon a 
belief not held by a cognizable group.  Under the second approach, 
challenges for cause are to enforce the second norm contained 
within the requirement of an impartial jury.14 
The notion of excluding a person for cause because of a risk of 
juror “misconduct” does not state a different idea.  The misconduct 
in question may be the employment of beliefs, whether about facts or 
values, that are not permitted to be used by jurors because of the 
decision just referred to, which restricts the use of background 
knowledge to that possessed by cognizable groups.  In order to justify 
exclusion for cause, it need not be certain that a prospective juror 
will employ prohibited beliefs; there need only be a certain 
likelihood that this will occur.  It is the law of challenges for cause 
 
 14 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-36 (1992) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment and due process may require a juror to be removed for cause). 
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that determines what risk requires exclusion.  At the same time, a 
party may be injured by an incorrect exclusion, because it will deprive 
him of a juror who was randomly selected from a fair cross-section of 
the population and who might well have limited himself to 
permissible background beliefs. 
As already noted, in addition to the ordinary law of cause, there 
is a constitutional standard in the “impartial jury” requirement of the 
Sixth Amendment against which dismissals of jurors in criminal cases 
must be measured.  In a line of cases involving the jury’s role in 
deciding whether capital punishment should be applied, the 
Supreme Court has held that although it is proper to dismiss from 
the jury persons whose opposition to capital punishment would 
substantially impair their ability to apply the law and weigh the 
evidence, it violates the Sixth Amendment and possibly the Due 
Process Clause to sustain challenges against persons who merely 
harbor doubts about capital punishment.  To exclude these persons 
when there is only some risk that they will allow themselves to be 
governed by impermissible views, violates the defendant’s right to the 
results of random selection from a representative cross-section of 
cognizable groups.15 
An unanswered question relevant to this discussion is the status 
of per se rules adopted by legislatures or courts to exclude for cause 
all those who have a certain characteristic.16  For example, drawing 
upon a recent case against tobacco companies that involved questions 
of both liability and damages,17 suppose the court excluded from the 
jury all those who belonged to the immediate family of a smoker who 
was a member of the class of plaintiffs that sought recovery, or all 
those who had a certain relationship by blood or marriage to such a 
smoker.18  By way of further example, in a prosecution in 1950 of the 
Secretary of the American Communist Party for contempt of 
Congress, the defendant at trial sought to have excluded for cause all 
federal employees.19  Since the prosecution was in the District of 
Columbia, this would have included a substantial percentage of the 
 
 15 Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 414-16 (1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 
U.S. 162 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586, 595-97 (1978); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
 16 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 545, 549 n.16 (1975) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887) (detailing 
typical reasons for exclusion for cause)). 
 17 Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., 814 So. 2d 544 (La. 2002). 
 18 In Scott, the court found error in the trial court’s refusal to exclude certain 
family members for cause, but not in its refusal to exclude others.  Id. 
 19 Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 164-65 (1950). 
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population.  On appeal, the defendant called to the Supreme Court’s 
attention an Executive Order requiring that the loyalty of all 
government employees be assured by their superiors.  The Court 
held, nevertheless, that the Sixth Amendment’s provision for an 
impartial jury did not require the exclusion of this class of persons.20  
The alternative to a per se rule is to consider all the information 
available about a prospective juror and then to apply a burden of 
proof rule relating to the risk of misconduct.  Such a rule would 
embody a judgment about how bad it is for a juror to use 
impermissible beliefs compared to how bad it is to prevent the use of 
permissible beliefs.  Thus, a per se rule might reflect a legislature’s or 
court’s decision not to leave it to individual judges to make 
particularized determinations on this matter.  A defendant may 
complain that the ordinary law of cause or the Sixth Amendment 
entitle him to just such a particularized judgment, or he may claim 
the opposite, that they entitle him to the application of a per se rule 
to keep off the jury all persons who have a certain characteristic that 
creates a certain risk of misconduct.21 
Here we may speak of another aspect of jury selection that has 
perplexed some courts.22  In view of the concern that the venire be a 
fair cross-section of the population, presumably because of the 
consequences for the composition of the petty jury, why is not the 
petty jury itself required to be a fair cross-section?  In a recent case 
involving a violent conflict between elements of the Jewish and Black 
communities in Brooklyn, the trial judge attempted to create a petty 
jury that would represent the affected groups.23  His efforts were 
repudiated by the court of appeals.24  We have just seen that there is 
concern with the composition of the petty jury in that persons who 
are members of noncognizable groups and who pose a certain risk of 
misconduct may or must be excluded for cause.  But keeping such 
persons off the jury is quite different from making sure that there are 
on the jury representatives of all the groups whose beliefs may 
 
 20 Id. at 172; see also United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 1992) (en 
banc) (in prosecution for conspiracy to deprive Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews of 
constitutional rights, holding that it was not error to refuse to strike for cause all 
Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews); Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 953-54 (D.C. 
1977) (in prosecution for holdup of priests in Catholic rectory, holding that it was 
not error to refuse to exclude for cause all Catholics). 
 21 See United States v. Ferri, 778 F.3d 985, 992-93 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing 
“implied bias”). 
 22 See, e.g., State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1160 (N.J. 1986). 
 23 United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 172 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835 
(2002). 
 24 Id. at 213. 
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properly influence verdicts and in proportions that reflect their size 
in the population.  Since the jury is limited to twelve persons, in 
order to comply with the suggested standard, only the very largest 
cognizable groups could be represented on the petty jury.  Excluded 
would be not only small groups whose beliefs ought not to affect 
verdicts through “jury notice,” but even mid-size groups as well, 
against the use of whose beliefs by way of jury notice there cannot be 
a valid objection on the basis of lack of fair notice to the parties or of 
entitlement under the basic political philosophy.  Under the 
prevailing system, although it may turn out that there are in fact no 
representatives of some or any mid-size belief groups on a particular 
jury, such groups do have a chance to have representation on petty 
juries, because selection is at random from a large venire that is a fair 
cross-section of all large and mid-size groups.  Complete exclusion of 
mid-size groups from petty juries would have a significant effect on 
verdicts and also on the excluded groups.  As will be appreciated, the 
policy underlying jury trial has something in common with 
proportional representation. 
Returning to challenges for cause and their relation to a party’s 
right to random selection from a venire that is a fair cross-section of 
cognizable groups, it is necessary to distinguish between exclusion 
from the jury for reasons intrinsic to its proper functioning—for 
instance that there is a certain risk of juror misconduct—and 
exclusion for extrinsic policy reasons.  In the latter category would be 
rules of disqualification of those who hold certain public offices or 
who perform functions deemed essential to the community, such as 
police or members of the Armed Forces.25  In the case of extrinsic 
policy, exclusion is not for the sake of the jury system, but to protect 
another important activity, either because the excluded class must be 
available for that activity or because engaging in jury service will in 
some way render the members of the class less effective in the 
performance of the other activity.  The extrinsic policy may be 
deemed adequately served not by a flat exclusion, but by making 
available to the persons in the class concerned an excuse from jury 
service, leaving it to individuals to decide whether their other 
obligation would be compromised.26 
In the case of some exclusions, both intrinsic and extrinsic 
objectives are served: If persons in the excluded class served as jurors, 
 
 25 See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 532-35; Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906) 
(stating that “for the good of the community . . . their regular work should not be 
interrupted”). 
 26 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 362 n.10, 367-69. 
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they might not be effective jurors because of their concern about 
their other responsibilities.  The excluded or excused group may or 
may not be a cognizable group for fair cross-section purposes.  It may 
be a group for purposes of the extrinsic policy—e.g., doctors or 
parents of young children—but not so far as concerns distinctive 
beliefs about the world or values.  Or perhaps although the group 
may have distinctive beliefs, it may not be large enough to be 
cognizable.27 
Taylor v. Louisiana,28 a case that involved a state law that excluded 
women from jury service unless they had filed a consent to be subject 
to it, combined all the aforementioned characteristics.  Women, the 
Supreme Court held, were a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment 
purposes because, speaking generally, they had different factual 
beliefs and values than men and constituted over half the population.  
Allowing them to be excluded meant that venires would not be a fair 
cross-section of the population of cognizable groups for Sixth 
Amendment purposes.  The state law excluding women could have 
served the extrinsic policy of encouraging women to devote 
themselves to their traditional functions in the domestic sphere and 
to stay out of a contentious public arena, but the Supreme Court 
refused to accept this policy as having sufficient importance to 
outweigh the fair cross-section value.  Excluding women could have 
been for intrinsic reasons as well—women, it might have been 
thought, generally do not have the attributes necessary to be effective 
jurors—but if this was a reason for the state law, the Supreme Court 
either rejected its factual premise or, as in the case of the extrinsic 
policy, found it insufficient to justify depriving the defendant of a 
venire that was a fair cross-section.  As will be seen below, the Court’s 
insistence that women are a cognizable group with distinctive beliefs 
is in conflict with the reasoning, shortly to be discussed, that the 
Court uses to support its conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause 
is violated by the use of a peremptory challenge to a juror based on 
sex.29 
A case to be discussed later, McDaniel v. Paty,30 involving the 
exclusion of ministers of religion from the legislature, resembles 
Taylor in its structure, with both intrinsic and extrinsic policies to be 
considered, but implicates not only the Religion Clauses of the First 
 
 27 For an indication of the importance of size, see id. at 369-70, and Taylor, 419 
U.S. at 531. 
 28 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
 29 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 157 (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra note 48 and 
accompanying text. 
 30 435 U.S. 618 (1978); see infra note 125. 
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Amendment, but also the Sixth Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
To the foregoing discussion of jury selection, especially the Sixth 
Amendment requirement of a fair cross-section of the population 
and challenges for cause, must now be added considerations flowing 
from the Equal Protection Clause, especially its policy of special 
protection for suspect classes, groups in regard to which there has 
been a history of invidious discrimination.  Invidiousness may involve 
elements of hatred, repugnance, fear, or inferiority.  As a result of 
these feelings, and perhaps because of its size, the suspect class may 
be relatively powerless to protect itself through the ordinary political 
process.  A group cognizable for Sixth Amendment purposes, 
constituted as such by its distinctive beliefs and size, may have no 
claim to be a specially protected class for equal protection purposes.  
A Sixth Amendment cognizable group may not be subject to 
invidious discrimination, and a specially protected group for equal 
protection purposes may have no distinctive beliefs or be too small to 
constitute a Sixth Amendment cognizable group.  The two ideas are 
constructed for entirely different purposes.  On the other hand, these 
two sorts of groups may coincide: An ethnic or national-origin or 
racial group—or a religious group—may be both a cognizable belief 
group and, perhaps in part because of its distinctive beliefs, subject to 
invidious discrimination and so a suspect class.31 
There may be a conflict between the policy of the Sixth 
Amendment and that of the Equal Protection Clause.  Suppose a 
prospective juror is a member of a distinctive belief group, but it is 
not a cognizable group because in the jurisdiction in which the court 
sits, the group—assume it is a racial-ethnic group like the Hmong 
from Southeast Asia—is not large enough.  Because there is a certain 
risk of juror misconduct in the form of a member of the group 
employing knowledge as a juror that ought only to influence the 
verdict if introduced through the formal process, a challenge for 
cause is made.  Assume that if only the Sixth Amendment is taken 
into account—the risk of misconduct—the challenge would be 
sustained.  This ruling would enforce only the fair cross-section 
policy.  But suppose the racial-ethnic group to which the prospective 
juror belongs is also a suspect class subject to invidious 
discrimination.  In some cases perhaps it can be argued that 
exclusion of the juror will not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because if the probability of misconduct is high enough to warrant 
 
 31 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977) (holding that Mexican-
Americans are a “distinct class” for equal protection purposes). 
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exclusion for cause, there will be no invidiousness implied by 
exclusion.  But if the challenge for cause is rejected because of 
injurious consequences to the excluded juror and his group, or 
because of some supposed injury to the trial process itself or to the 
judicial system as a consequence of exclusion, then the policy of the 
Sixth Amendment would be subordinated to that of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Another case can be imagined.  Suppose an accused is 
prosecuted for the murder of a Korean grocer and in the course of 
jury selection seeks to exclude all Koreans for cause.  Possibly 
Koreans would be a distinctive belief group for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, possessing attitudes and ideas different from other racial-
ethnic groups, but they are not numerous enough in the jurisdiction 
to qualify for Sixth Amendment purposes.  Defendant claims that 
there is a serious risk that Korean jurors will use their distinctive but 
impermissible background beliefs, and that because of this risk, his 
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury would be violated by 
allowing them to serve.  He also claims that because of their 
identification with the victim, there is an additional risk that Korean 
jurors will ignore the law and the evidence in determining their 
verdict.  Koreans may also be a specially protected class for purposes 
of the Equal Protection Clause.  This is not necessarily because of 
their distinctive beliefs nor because of their size, but because they 
have been subjected to invidious discrimination.  If, as in the case of 
the Hmong, a challenge for cause is rejected, this represents a 
determination that the evil of reinforcing invidious discrimination 
outweighs the defendant’s interests under the Sixth Amendment.32 
If we return to the Taylor case, discussed above,33 this time taking 
into account the Equal Protection Clause, we can see that the result 
in that case—striking down the exemption of women—did not 
sacrifice the Sixth Amendment to the Equal Protection Clause, nor 
the reverse.  The decision upheld both: it avoided any invidiousness 
that the absence of women on the venire and the petty jury might 
have implied, and it assured to defendant the result of random 
selection from a cross-section to which he was entitled under the 
 
 32 An example of equal protection concerns being held to outweigh the interests 
of the parties or Sixth Amendment rights may be found in cases rejecting challenges 
for cause to deaf jurors, and even peremptory challenges, though here the 
“misconduct” of which there is a risk is not the application of impermissible beliefs, 
but the inability to perceive evidence.  People v. Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 
1990) (challenge for cause); People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Westchester County 
Ct. 1990) (peremptory). 
 33 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
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Sixth Amendment.  The only policy rejected, at least when given such 
broad protection as the exemption made available to all women, was 
the extrinsic policy that excluded women in order to protect their 
traditional role.  Of course it must be kept in mind that the fact that 
the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause call for the 
same result is purely coincidental, because they proceed on different 
rationales.  Indeed, the rationale that was to the fore in Taylor—that 
women have distinctive beliefs—is, as we will see, largely repudiated 
in the later case of J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,34 involving peremptory 
challenges and the Equal Protection Clause. 
In the case of Blacks also, there ordinarily will not be a conflict 
between the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.  
Would Blacks be a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment purposes?  
Even if Blacks are sufficiently numerous, the Supreme Court would 
be most reluctant to ascribe to them distinctive beliefs and values, 
because this would openly collide with the attitudes it seeks to 
promote in its equal protection jurisprudence.  Thus there is no 
equivalent to the Taylor decision in the case of Blacks.  In any event, 
even if both the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause 
are relevant in the case of Blacks, both clauses point in the same 
direction: A challenge for cause simply on the basis that a juror is 
Black should not be sustained. 
Finally, a short digression may be permitted to consider 
disqualification of voters, which may be analogous to disqualification 
of jurors for cause.  Familiar grounds for disqualification of voters 
would be alienage, minority, conviction of felony, or mental 
incompetence.35  These grounds of disqualification are ordinarily the 
result of constitutional or statutory provisions and not of judge-made 
law.  They are in the nature of per se rules, and do not provide for 
individualized determinations, which often are undertaken in the 
case of challenges for cause to jurors.  Most of the grounds of 
disqualification of voters are concerned with the quality of the 
electoral process—excluding classes of persons unlikely to have the 
intelligence, information, or values necessary to make a useful 
political contribution.  Other grounds for exclusion may have more 
subtle purposes, such as to exclude those considered not part of the 
political community or to punish persons who have attacked its basic 
values. 
 
 34 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 35 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.02 (2)(A) (alien); (2)(B) (age); (2)(C) 
(mentally incompetent); (7)(A) (convicted of felony) (2001 & Supp. 2003); 
Sherman v. United States, 155 U.S. 673 (1895). 
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If, as noted earlier, the task of jurors is mainly to make 
determinations of fact, in the case of voters it is the opposite, to make 
determinations of value.  Of course, determinations of value will, to 
an extent, be premised upon determinations of fact.  Neither in 
regard to facts nor values are voters restricted to employing beliefs 
held by a group of a certain size in the population.  As has been 
suggested, jurors are limited to the fact and value beliefs held by 
some group of substantial size, unless the beliefs are introduced 
through the formal process of proof.  Thus in the case of voters, 
there is nothing analogous to the idea of a “cognizable group” found 
in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, nor is there random selection 
from a fair cross-section.  The voter votes as an individual, all 
qualified individuals may vote, and every voter may rely on whatever 
fact and value opinions he has.  Thus, the only misconduct that need 
be considered in the case of voting, not already provided for by the 
per se rules of disqualification, would be bribery or coercion.36 
The statement just made that there are no restrictions imposed 
upon the information and values voters may apply may have to be 
qualified by limitations coming from the Equal Protection Clause.  If 
it is unconstitutional for a jury to render a verdict not capable of 
justification except by reference to an animus toward a suspect class, 
it would similarly be unconstitutional for the voters to be thus 
motivated.37  Both the jurors and the voters exercise state power.  
Whether there are additional restrictions imposed on jurors and 
voters by the Religion Clauses will be considered in due course. 
We come now to the question of peremptory challenges, and in 
the first place whether their allowance conflicts with the Sixth 
Amendment right to an “impartial jury.”  If the Sixth Amendment 
right is understood to guarantee that the petty jury will be a body of 
persons that is exclusively the result of random selection from a fair 
cross-section, by definition there is a conflict.  If a peremptory 
challenge removes a person who is a member of a cognizable group 
in respect to factual beliefs or values, perhaps precisely because he is 
a member of such a group, it interferes with the operation of the laws 
of chance that otherwise might have placed that person on the petty 
jury.  But to find a violation of the Sixth Amendment in these 
circumstances would be an unreasonable interpretation of the 
 
 36 See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982) (bribery); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
1973i (2000) (coercion). 
 37 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1995) (holding that state constitutional 
amendment adopted by referendum was “born of animosity toward the class of 
persons affected”). 
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Amendment in view of the fact that at the time the Amendment was 
adopted, the use of peremptories was well established, and there is no 
reason to think the Framers intended to abolish the practice.38  The 
Sixth Amendment, in assuring a venire that is a fair cross-section and 
requiring exclusion from the petty jury of persons challengeable for 
cause because of a risk of misconduct, has achieved its purpose even 
though the jury may be further narrowed by the parties’ removing 
those who, although members of cognizable groups, are at one 
extreme or the other of the venire.39  This conclusion is supported by 
Justice O’Connor’s view in the capital punishment cases, referred to 
above, that although it is not permissible to exclude for cause a 
person who merely has doubts about capital punishment, it is 
permissible to exclude such a person by a peremptory challenge.40 
What do peremptory challenges do?  Challenges for cause, as we 
have seen, remove those who pose a certain risk of misconduct, 
especially the misconduct of going beyond the bounds of permissible 
beliefs in regard to either facts or values.  These challenges can be 
seen as simply enforcing the Sixth Amendment policy.  But a juror 
may still pose some risk of misconduct, even though not sufficient to 
warrant removal for cause.  The parties may use their limited number 
of peremptories to remove jurors who pose this lower, although not 
insignificant, risk.  Some may argue that this use of peremptories will 
help bring about a truly impartial jury, but this is not an impartial 
jury in the sense required by the Sixth Amendment.  In addition to 
eliminating a risk of misconduct, the parties may remove through 
peremptories persons who pose no risk of misconduct, since they will 
employ beliefs entirely within the permitted range, but who in the 
judgment of the parties simply would be unfavorable to them.  There 
is nothing objectionable about providing this opportunity for the 
operation of self-interest.  Indeed, allowing the parties to participate 
in this way, without even a demand for rationality—though doubtless 
they will have their reasons—may make verdicts more acceptable to 
those directly affected and to the public.41 
 
 38 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)). 
 39 See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478-80 (1990). 
 40 Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
denial of certiorari); see also State v. Bolton, 896 P.2d 830, 842 (Ariz. 1995). 
 41 See Holland, 493 U.S. at 480 (“But it [the fair cross-section value] has never 
included the notion that, in the process of drawing the jury, that initial 
representativeness cannot be diminished by allowing both the accused and the State 
to eliminate persons thought to be inclined against their interests . . . .”); see also 
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Holland and referring to 
“[o]ur belief that experienced lawyers will often correctly intuit which jurors are 
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In Batson v. Kentucky,42 peremptory challenges based on race, and 
in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,43 peremptory challenges based on sex, 
were held unconstitutional.  If peremptory challenges generally do 
not violate the Sixth Amendment, neither do peremptory challenges 
based on race or sex.  A racial group may or may not be a cognizable 
group for Sixth Amendment purposes.  As noted above, Taylor v. 
Louisiana44 held that men and women are cognizable groups.  If a 
group is not a cognizable group, elimination of one of their members 
by a peremptory challenge has no significance from a Sixth 
Amendment perspective.  Even if a group is a cognizable group, 
elimination of one of its members by a peremptory challenge is not a 
violation of the Sixth Amendment for the reason stated above—that 
this would be an unreasonable interpretation of the Framers’ intent 
in historical context.  Thus, it is the Equal Protection Clause alone, 
and not the Sixth Amendment, that is violated by peremptory 
challenges based on race or sex.  Early in the use of the Equal 
Protection Clause to prohibit peremptories based on race, it was 
suggested that it was the right of the party opposed to the challenge, 
or a combination of his right and that of the excluded juror, that was 
violated.45  Later cases have emphasized the right of the juror not to 
be excluded.46 
The justification for finding peremptory challenges based on 
race or sex in conflict with the Equal Protection Clause may be that 
the Court disagrees with the factual premises upon which such 
challenges are based.  The Court may reject entirely the idea that 
different races or the two sexes have different beliefs, or it may 
disagree with the importance that the peremptory implicitly attaches 
 
likely to be the least sympathetic”); id. at 160-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that 
adversarial trial strategies, such as peremptories, should be judged within the system 
as a whole); Babcock, supra note 16, at 551; Chambers, supra note 5, at 575-76; 
Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, 
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 771-72 (1992); Karen M. Bray, Comment, Reaching 
the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 559 (1992).  
But see United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 (2000) (noting “a 
principal reason for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional guarantee of 
trial by an impartial jury”); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.8 (“The only legitimate interest it 
[a party] could possibly have in the exercise of its peremptory challenges is securing 
a fair and impartial jury.”).  Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992), recognizes 
that the role of litigants in determining jury composition provides one reason for 
wide acceptance of verdicts. 
 42 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 43 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 44 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
 45 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. 
 46 E.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140, 142 n.13; McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48-49. 
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to the fact of race or sex.  On the other hand, the Court may not 
disagree with the premises, but judge that even if they are correct, 
these facts—the difference in ideas between the races or sexes—are 
social constructs, and bad ones at that, because they have pernicious 
effects on individuals and groups.  Even if the differences are facts of 
nature, the Court may think that they are unhappy facts and should 
not be reinforced by legal recognition, including through the use of 
peremptory challenges premised on these facts.  As to the first 
suggested justification, it would be unusual for a court to deny a 
peremptory challenge simply because it disagreed with the opinion 
or hunch on which it is based—indeed that would be inconsistent 
with the argument in favor of the usefulness of peremptories.  As to 
the second suggested justification, in the case of sex it is in obvious 
conflict with the Taylor case, where the Court expressly relied upon its 
view that men and women have different beliefs, in reaching the 
conclusion that each sex is a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment 
purposes.  The Court neither condemned the idea that a difference 
exists nor suggested that the difference produced evil consequences.47  
But in J.E.B., the Court took the view that the treatment of women 
over a long period of time, including their complete exclusion from 
juries, had been invidious, and that this historical background 
conferred invidiousness on present-day use of peremptories against 
women.  It remains something of a mystery how this reasoning leads 
to the further conclusion that peremptories used against men are 
also infected with invidiousness, though this was in fact the situation 
involved in J.E.B.48 
It has long been held that there is no constitutional right to 
peremptories either in the Sixth Amendment or anywhere else in the 
Constitution.49  The only question is whether the Equal Protection 
Clause forbids their use in certain situations.  If a peremptory 
 
 47 419 U.S. 522 (1975); see J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139 n.11 (“Even if a measure of truth 
can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to justify gender-based 
peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support discrimination on the basis of 
gender in jury selection.”); id. at 149 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]o say that 
gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no 
difference as a matter of fact.”); id. at 157 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting conflict with 
Taylor v. Louisiana); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1051 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“Without denying the possibility that race . . . makes a difference in jury 
decisionmaking . . . it seems to me that the better course is to ensure a fair shake by 
denying each side the right to make race-based selections.  The cost of the alternative 
is simply too great.”); Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 942 (1986) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[Batson] is a special rule of relevance, a 
statement about what this Nation stands for, rather than a statement of fact.”). 
 48 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 156 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 49 See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). 
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challenge otherwise allowable is denied because of the ground on 
which it is based, the cost falls on the challenging party in respect to 
the benefits that peremptories confer: eliminating jurors who pose 
some risk of misconduct; eliminating jurors the parties think not 
favorably disposed towards them; and allowing the parties to 
participate in the construction of the tribunal that is to judge them. 
It is important not to exaggerate the effect of eliminating 
peremptories based on race and sex.  If the probabilities of juror 
misconduct rise above a certain level, there will be available a 
challenge for cause or a challenge based upon that aspect of the 
Sixth Amendment’s requirement of an impartial jury that limits the 
effects of random selection.50  If a juror is excused for cause when 
race or sex plays some part in bringing the probabilities of 
misconduct to a dangerous level, there may be, as in the case of 
peremptories, some possibility of injury to the dismissed juror and 
the class he represents.  But because of the high likelihood of 
misconduct, as suggested earlier, few would see this exclusion as 
invidious.  The Court has indicated that if a peremptory is based 
upon some circumstance other than sex or race, the mere fact that it 
has a disparate impact on one sex or a race will not cause a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.51 
Batson held that the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was satisfied by the fact that the peremptory challenge 
there in question had been exercised by the prosecutor, acting for 
the state.52  Subsequent to that decision, it was held that the state-
action requirement is also satisfied when the challenge is made by a 
party to a civil case53 and even by a criminal defendant.54  The result in 
the last situation—deeming the criminal defendant to be exercising 
state power even though the state is pursuing him and he is doing 
everything in his power to escape—is more or less fantastic.55  Even in 
the case of civil parties, to hold that they fall within the purposes of 
the state-action requirement of the Equal Protection Clause when 
they make peremptory challenges, loses sight of the justification for 
 
 50 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of situations in 
which the Sixth Amendment requires exclusion, see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 
221 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 51 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143. 
 52 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 
 53 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991). 
 54 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59. 
 55 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 150 (O’Connor, J., concurring); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62-
63 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant’s 
Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 808 (1989). 
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peremptories in allowing the parties to pursue within certain limits 
their own interests, in the hope that this will win acceptance of 
verdicts.  If in exercising peremptories, the parties are state actors, 
why are they not state actors when they offer evidence or make 
argument?56  A few courts indeed have adopted this extension and 
forbidden evidence to be introduced when it concerns the attitude or 
behavior of members of an ethnic group.57  Apparently, these courts 
judge that the collateral social damage from the parties’ introducing 
such evidence and jurors’ drawing inferences based on ethnic or 
racial generalizations, even though they may be correct, outweighs 
the importance of allowing relevant evidence to be considered.58  
Although the selection of evidence to be introduced is made by the 
party, not by the state, with the law making a contribution only in that 
it allows the evidence to be put before the trier, the limitations of the 
Equal Protection Clause are to be enforced.  So far as peremptory 
challenges are concerned, those based on race or sex violate the 
Equal Protection Clause no matter what party makes them, and 
evidently this is settled law.  Possibly it can be argued that there is less 
reason to see the state-action requirement of the Equal Protection 
Clause satisfied in the case of peremptories than in the case of 
introducing evidence, since in the former, the only effect is the 
absence on the jury of an individual who otherwise would be there, 
whereas with the latter, a basis is provided upon which the jury—
clearly an organ of the state—rests its verdict. 
II. THE RELIGION CLAUSES GENERALLY 
In order to answer the questions presented by peremptory 
challenges relating to religion, it is necessary briefly to consider in 
 
 56 Justice Scalia asked this question in his dissent in J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 163. 
 57 E.g., United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1211-13 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 58 In Jinro America, Inc. v. Secure Investments, Inc., 266 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2001), the 
court held it error to allow an expert to testify to the practice of Korean businesses to 
engage in fraud and corruption, this practice being suggested to have probative 
value as to whether a certain transaction engaged in by plaintiff, a Korean company, 
was a sham.  The holding was based, not upon constitutional considerations, but in 
part at least on Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which requires that evidence be 
excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.”  FED. R. EVID. 403.  But the court did not make clear whether the error lay 
simply in the evidence’s use of “ethnic or cultural stereotyping,” or in the likelihood 
that the stereotype would cause the jury to return a verdict based on disgust, fear, or 
hostility.  Jinro, 266 F.3d at 1007-08.  The court’s opinion reviews many other cases 
involving evidence of ethnic group characteristics.  See also United States v. Cabrera, 
222 F.3d 590 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that both Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and 
due process were violated by allowing detective to testify in drug prosecution to drug 
habits of Cubans). 
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addition to the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, 
the general law of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.  
Both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause must be 
considered: the first because the exclusion of a juror on account of 
his religion may burden the exercise of his religion; the second 
because the standards for permissible government action under that 
clause—action that includes the exercise of power by juries—may 
give reason to exclude from juries persons likely to disregard them, 
and also because forbidding the exercise of peremptory challenges 
based upon religion may provide a degree of support for religion not 
permitted by the Establishment Clause. 
As is well known, the Free Exercise Clause is currently the site of 
a struggle between two sharply opposed views concerning the rights 
of conscience and the limits of the ordinary political process, between 
what may be referred to as the Sherbert-Yoder reading of the Free 
Exercise Clause59 and the Smith reading of that clause.60  Under 
Sherbert-Yoder, if government action burdens the practice of a person’s 
religion, the burden being judged such from a secular and not from a 
religious point of view, even though there may be a secular purpose 
to the government action, the imposition of the burden must be 
justified by a compelling state interest that is promoted by the least 
intrusive means.  As applied in the Sherbert case itself, this meant that 
a Seventh Day Adventist who could not find a job because her 
religion prevented her from working on Saturday was required to be 
given unemployment compensation even though the state’s 
unemployment program did not allow it in the circumstances; and in 
the Yoder case, that Amish parents could not be compelled by the 
criminal law to send their children to school past the eighth grade 
when their religion forbade it.  Under the Smith approach, if the 
burden on religion is the result of a “neutral, generally applicable 
law”—such as that all children must attend school until the age of 
sixteen—that is the end of any claim under the Free Exercise Clause, 
no matter how heavy the burden on the practice of religion or the 
slightness of the state interest advanced by the law.61 
Whether the Smith rule is established beyond reconsideration is 
not entirely clear.  The rule announced in Smith arguably was dictum, 
 
 59 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1961). 
 60 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 61 Id. at 880.  In fact in the Smith case, as will be mentioned shortly, an exception 
was articulated for the situation presented by Yoder of Amish parents being unwilling 
to send their children to school past the eighth grade.  See infra note 72 and 
accompanying text. 
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uttered without benefit of briefs or oral argument on the question 
involved.  It was reexamined in Church of the Lukumi Babalu, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah,62 in which it was found in fact not to apply.  Four years 
later the rule was reiterated in City of Boerne v. Flores,63 in which, 
although there was an extensive review of historical materials relevant 
to the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and a rejection of 
Congress’s power to alter the Smith rule and restore Sherbert-Yoder, 
there was no actual application of Smith to the case at hand.  The 
dissenters to the decision in Smith continue to insist that it is an 
incorrect reading of the Free Exercise Clause and that under the 
circumstances stare decisis should not be seen as an obstacle to 
repudiating it.64 
The Smith rule, in spite of the seemingly clear statement of it set 
forth above, is in fact very unclear.  This unclarity leaves the way open 
for a minimalist interpretation that would permit the Sherbert-Yoder 
rule to continue to apply in a large number of situations.  Indeed, the 
unclarity of the Smith rule could allow for its almost complete 
elimination at the hands of perplexed or determined lower courts, 
and some have already set about this task.65  A plurality of the 
Supreme Court holds the view that the Smith rule involves two distinct 
ideas: “neutral” and “generally applicable.”  For the plurality, 
“neutral” refers to the fact that a law is reasonably capable of 
justification on a secular ground—e.g., in the case of a prohibition on 
the use of peyote, the situation involved in Smith, the protection of 
health—and also, perhaps, that the legislature was actually motivated 
by that reason.66  “Generally applicable” refers to the purpose of the 
law as determined from the text itself and from its administration.67  
Other Justices believe that “neutral” and “generally applicable” mean 
substantially the same thing.68 
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,69 the Court struck down 
under the Free Exercise Clause city ordinances prohibiting animal 
 
 62 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 63 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 64 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 559 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 65 E.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 817 (1999); Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 940 F. 
Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996). 
 66 See Church of the Lukumi Balalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533. 
 67 See id. at 542-45.  Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: 
Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 
(2001), argues that there are two distinct requirements. 
 68 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 69 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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sacrifice for ritual purposes, holding that the ordinances were not 
neutral and generally applicable, with the consequence that the 
Sherbert-Yoder rather than the Smith standard applied.  The Court 
found that the ordinances permitted the killing of animals for many 
secular purposes—sport and science, for instance—while prohibiting 
religious sacrifice.  But the fact that the ordinances permitted almost 
all secular killings, but not all, left a doubt as to the sense in which 
they were non-neutral and not generally applicable.  Does a law fail 
the Smith test only when a religious use is the sole object of 
prohibition, or might it also fail that test even though some secular 
uses are also covered by the prohibition?70  If it might fail though 
some secular uses are forbidden, how many and what kind of secular 
uses?  Might a law be neutral and generally applicable only when its 
prohibition extends to religious use and to all secular uses?  What 
policy would determine the point along the scale where the line is to 
be drawn?  The inclusion within the prohibited class of some or of 
many secular uses will determine the relative effect of a government 
action or program on the positions of religion and nonreligion in the 
society.  But there still must be resort to some fundamental 
philosophy to determine what is the permissible relative effect.  No 
solution can be found simply by reference to “underinclusiveness” or 
by a mechanical insistence that if one secular use is permitted, 
religious use must also be permitted.  From the fundamental 
constitutional philosophy must be derived both the value attached to 
various secular objectives and the value attached to the practice of 
religion.  This question will be discussed further in considering 
another part of the Smith opinion, which states that the Smith rule 
does not apply when provision is made in the law for “individualized 
assessment” of liability or benefits.  In any event, holding that the 
Free Exercise Clause never entitles religion to exemption when all 
secular instances are prohibited, cannot rest upon simple assertion. 
Apart from the unclarity of “neutral [and] generally applicable,” 
there are exceptions to the Smith rule expressly set forth in the Smith 
opinion itself: It does not apply in “hybrid” cases, and as just 
mentioned, it does not apply in cases in which there is “individualized 
governmental assessment.”71  If a case comes within one of these 
exceptions, the familiar Sherbert-Yoder standard applies.  These 
exceptions in the hands of lower courts unhappy with the Smith rule 
 
 70 See Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 364-67 (holding that Free Exercise 
Clause was violated by refusal to allow police to wear beards for religious reasons 
when allowed for medical reasons); Duncan, supra note 67, at 868-83 (discussing 
“underinclusiveness”). 
 71 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881, 884. 
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also have the capacity virtually to destroy it. 
The hybrid exception applies when, in addition to a claim under 
the Free Exercise Clause, there is also a claim on some other 
constitutional ground, for instance free speech, freedom of 
association, substantive due process, or protected property rights.  In 
Smith, the Court distinguished Yoder on the ground that it involved a 
substantive due process claim: the right of parents to determine the 
education of their children.72  Courts and commentators have 
pointed out that if there is a violation of an independent 
constitutional right, invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is 
superfluous.73  Some courts have held that all that is needed to satisfy 
the hybrid exception is a “colorable” independent constitutional 
claim.74  Such a colorable claim will activate the free exercise claim 
and make Sherbert-Yoder applicable.  However, no court has been able 
to explain why such a merely colorable constitutional claim should 
have this effect.  Some courts have noted that there is scarcely a case 
in which another colorable constitutional claim cannot be made.75  
For example, in City of Boerne v. Flores,76 mentioned above, one of the 
two Supreme Court decisions since Smith that reaffirmed its doctrine, 
an Archbishop wished for pastoral reasons to enlarge a church, but 
was prohibited from doing so by the local Landmark Commission.  In 
addition to his free exercise claim, did not the Archbishop have a 
colorable claim of deprivation of constitutionally protected property 
rights?  In Smith itself, in addition to the free exercise claim, the 
petitioners could have argued that their rights to free speech and 
freedom of association had been violated: peyote use was probably an 
expressive activity and almost certainly involved association with 
others. 
The exemption stated in Smith for cases in which the state has in 
place a system of “individualized governmental assessment,” of which 
Sherbert was suggested to be an example,77 is almost as unclear as the 
hybrid exception.  The reference could be to situations in which 
there is a high degree of official discretion, which might be exercised 
 
 72 Id. at 888. 
 73 Jonathan B. Hensley, Note, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights Doctrine in Free Exercise 
Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119 (2000) (reviewing lower court decisions). 
 74 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), reh’g 
granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 220 F.3d 
1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (vacating lower court’s judgment and remanding with 
instructions to dismiss as not ripe for review), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001). 
 75 See, e.g., id. at 705. 
 76 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 77 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
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to the unjustified disadvantaging of religion, thus eliciting the 
protective response of the Sherbert-Yoder requirement.78  Another 
possibility is that what the Court means to cover by this 
“individualized” exception are situations in which, although law is 
made and discretion limited, this is done in a common-law fashion, 
by the accumulation of precedents, perhaps in the course of 
interpreting broad statutory language.  But why would use of this 
process of law-making call for departure from the Smith rule?  Finally, 
a system of “individualized governmental assessment” could refer 
simply to those cases in which a law disadvantages religion to a degree 
that conflicts with the fundamental norm underlying the Religion 
Clauses regarding the permissible relative effect of state action on the 
positions of the religious and the secular in society.  This idea of the 
significance of the breadth of entitlement or of burdens under a 
government program is familiar in Establishment Clause analysis,79 
but here it appears in connection with the Free Exercise Clause.  If 
animal sacrifice is permitted for science and sport, then possibly the 
Free Exercise Clause requires that it be allowed for religious 
purposes.  Language in Sherbert suggests that this idea of permissible 
relative effect, either in regard to entitlements or burdens, could be 
part of the explanation for that decision: If unemployment 
compensation is provided to those who are not available for work for 
some “personal reasons,” then it must be provided to those who are 
not available for work for religious reasons.80  As will be appreciated, 
this way of reading the “individualized assessment” exception suggests 
that in fact it is not an exception to the Smith rule at all, but that the 
existence of various provisions in the government program has 
rendered it not a “neutral law of general applicability.”  And to repeat 
what was stated earlier, if the values embodied in the Free Exercise 
Clause require that religion not be excluded from a benefit when 
some or many secular activities are admitted to it, it should not be out 
of the question that those same values may require that religion 
receive a benefit even when the legislature has attempted to limit the 
advantages of a program to a particular state objective and to exclude 
all other interests, secular and religious.  Thus, in the context of the 
 
 78 For useful observations on Smith’s “individualized assessment” exception, see 
American Friends Service Committee Corp. v. Thornburgh, 951 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 
1991).  See also Kenneth D. Sansom, Note, Sharing the Burden: Exploring the Space 
Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 753, 765 n.85 (1999). 
 79 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 80 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401-02 n.4 (1963). 
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Sherbert case, the very values that require the state to give 
unemployment compensation to Mrs. Sherbert when it makes them 
available to those who cannot work for some secular personal 
reasons, may require it to give compensation to Mrs. Sherbert even if 
it does not do so for any secular personal reasons.  This is because the 
Free Exercise Clause attaches such great value to a person’s being 
able to live in accordance with her conscience: If the state pursues a 
certain secular objective—e.g., by an insurance scheme it seeks to 
offset the effects of economic recession and business dislocations—it 
must be equally protective of religious conscience. 
Whatever exactly the Smith rule is, its announcement signaled a 
sharp break from an important idea of the Framers, embodied in the 
Free Exercise Clause, an idea referred to by Justice O’Connor in City 
of Boerne when she spoke of the “special constitutional status” of 
religion.81  This idea essentially is that a person has a moral duty to act 
in accordance with his conscience and that the state has a correlative 
duty not to interfere with the discharge of this primary duty except 
for weighty reasons.  Even if the Free Exercise Clause does not rest 
upon the same morality that moves the conscience of the individual, 
it does rest upon a morality that recognizes an individual’s duty to act 
in accordance with conscience. 
This idea received eloquent expression in Chief Justice Hughes’s 
dissenting opinion in United States v. McIntosh.82  That case concerned 
a Presbyterian minister who had applied for naturalization.  The case 
involved the interpretation of an act of Congress that required as a 
condition of naturalization an oath of allegiance.  The minister was 
willing to take the oath, but only if he could reserve the duty he 
believed he owed to God.  The majority of the Court held that under 
the statute he was not qualified to become a citizen.  Chief Justice 
Hughes, in a much-quoted dissent, took the position that the statute 
should not be interpreted in a manner so contrary to our founding 
ideology and political traditions.  His opinion in McIntosh, even 
though not directly addressed to a constitutional question, implied 
that the source of the constitutional right to the free exercise of 
religion lies in a belief in an obligation to follow conscience.  What 
marks off the right of free exercise from other constitutional rights—
for instance the right of free speech—is the importance attached to 
the state of mind of the individual, his sense of an obligation that 
transcends human authority.  Chief Justice Hughes’s view of the 
correct interpretation of the Naturalization Act, as illuminated by the 
 
 81 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 563 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 82 283 U.S. 605, 627, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). 
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tradition of respect for conscience, became the view of the Court 
itself in Girouard v. United States,83 which overruled McIntosh. 
Unease in some of the lower courts manifested by a narrow 
understanding of when the Smith rule applies, a liberal reading of its 
exceptions, or outright unwillingness to believe that Smith means 
what it says as applied to certain pre-Smith cases, evidences the 
magnitude of the break between the Smith rule and the earlier 
understanding, just referred to, of the importance of obligations 
believed to be derived from a source higher than human authority.  
An example of the second type of response to Smith is the panel 
decision in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,84 where the 
court held that the refusal on religious grounds of a landlord to rent 
to unmarried couples, contrary to a state statute, came within the 
hybrid exception to Smith—a colorable constitutional property right 
as well as a free exercise claim—and that there was no compelling 
reason to override religious conscience in the circumstances.85  
Examples of the third response to Smith are the decisions of those 
courts that have refused to find that Smith overrules the so-called 
“ministerial exception,” under which decisions relating to the 
employment of clergy are constitutionally exempt from state 
regulations applicable to other sorts of employment.86 
Mention also may be made of a line of decisions in which the 
Supreme Court has held that because of free exercise concerns, there 
must be special rules for deciding intra-church disputes, which will 
enable civil courts to avoid answering questions about religious 
doctrine or polity, even though they are free to answer similar 
doctrinal and organizational questions in a secular context.87  Lower 
courts continue to observe this special rule requirement even though 
it may be in contravention of Smith and not within any of its 
exceptions.88 
As already suggested, in assessing challenges to jurors on 
religious grounds, not only must the Free Exercise Clause be 
 
 83 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
 84 165 F.3d at 711-12, 717-18. 
 85 Compare Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), a pre-Smith 
decision, which upheld against a free exercise claim the denial of tax exemption to 
an educational institution that discriminated in admissions on racial grounds for 
religious reasons. 
 86 E.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 87 E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Presbyterian Church in the United 
States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
 88 See, e.g., Pentecostal Church of God I.M. of New Haven, Inc. v. Pentecostal 
Church of God International Movement, 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 1 (2001). 
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considered, but the Establishment Clause as well.  Refusal to allow 
such challenges when challenges on nonreligious grounds are 
allowed might give a degree of assistance to religion that is forbidden 
by the Establishment Clause.  At the other extreme, if a religiously-
motivated verdict would violate the Establishment Clause, it might be 
required by that clause that a challenge aimed at eliminating the risk 
of such a verdict be sustained. 
Under the Establishment Clause, the primary focus is on the 
“purpose” of a law or other government action, although occasionally 
attention also is given to actual effects, whether benefits or burdens.89  
The notion of purpose in this context appears to embrace two ideas: 
first, that the law be capable of justification on a secular ground—
possibly meaning without reference to the transcendent or 
supernatural, though doubtless this does not exclude all ideas of 
value—and second, that on its face the relative effect of the law in 
regard to benefits or burdens on the positions of religion and 
nonreligion in the society be of a certain kind.  What is the 
permissible relative effect, as noted earlier, must be derived from a 
substantive constitutional philosophy that attaches a certain 
importance to religion compared to other human interests.  It should 
be noted that this second requirement may be violated even though 
the law or other government action is capable of justification on 
entirely secular grounds. 
In addition to limiting the “purpose” of government programs in 
the ways just indicated, there is some basis for believing that the 
Establishment Clause also requires that such programs actually have 
been motivated by secular and not religious beliefs.  The strongest 
precedent for this additional requirement is Epperson v. Arkansas,90 
where in invalidating a law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in 
the public schools, the Supreme Court relied on statements made in 
the public debate preceding the vote on the popular initiative that 
resulted in the law, that the theory of evolution was inconsistent with 
the creation account in the Bible.91  A government action might be 
capable of justification on secular grounds, but still actually have 
been motivated by religious belief.  Thus, if the Free Exercise Clause 
is concerned with the actual effect of legislation on religious believers 
and the problem posed for their consciences, the Establishment 
 
 89 For a summary of the Court’s tergiversations on this matter, see Zelman, 536 
U.S. at 655-60. 
 90 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 91 Id. at 106-09.  Additional support for the proposition that actual motive matters 
may be found in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), but the Court’s opinion is 
not clear on the point. 
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Clause may be concerned with the actual beliefs and motivations of 
legislators and other government officials and even of voters. 
Among the Supreme Court’s many Establishment Clause 
decisions, it is only with difficulty that one can find consistency.  
Thus, is it possible to uphold an act of Congress that permits religious 
organizations to discriminate on religious grounds in the treatment 
of their employees—e.g., firing a janitor employed by a Mormon-
owned gymnasium open to the public because he was not “temple 
worthy”92—and at the same time to strike down legislation that 
exempts religious publications from a state sales tax?93 
In recent years the Court has increasingly relaxed the 
restrictions of the Establishment Clause and widened the area within 
which legislative discretion may operate.94  Furthermore, bit by bit, it 
has abandoned or relaxed limiting ancillary tests that when adopted 
were intended to implement general Establishment Clause objectives.  
In school aid programs, for example, the Court no longer requires 
any sort of “separation” between the secular and the religious in 
private schools—e.g., a state-employed sign-language translator may 
assist a student attending a parochial school, even by translating 
religion lessons.95  The recent decision permitting a voucher program 
that includes religiously-affiliated schools96 marks the culmination of 
a long trend to relax earlier doctrinal restrictions. 
The relation between the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause continues to be notoriously difficult to explain.  
Under Sherbert, there was a possibility that everything that was not 
forbidden by the former was required by the latter; Justice Harlan 
pointed this out in his dissent in Sherbert.97  Under the Smith regime, 
there is less likelihood of conflict between the two clauses because the 
tendency of Smith is to conform free exercise analysis to that of the 
Establishment Clause: If the “purpose” of the program is 
permissible—i.e., it is neutral and generally applicable—it does not 
matter that an effect may be to burden the free exercise of religion.  
As mentioned earlier, the Establishment Clause itself is only rarely 
suggested to be concerned with the actual effect of a government 
program on the practice of religion; it is concerned with purpose and 
 
 92 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 93 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 94 For the most recent step in this direction in connection with aid to education, 
see Zelman, 536 U.S. 639. 
 95 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); see also Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 639 (2000). 
 96 Zelman, 536 U.S. 639. 
 97 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 418, 422-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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perhaps with legislative motive.  The Smith regime, combined with the 
relaxation of Establishment Clause limitations, greatly reduces the 
tension between the two clauses.  But, of course, if under Smith a law 
is not neutral and generally applicable, or if one of the exceptions 
applies, then the Sherbert-Yoder test will be enforced, so that the 
problem of tension between the two clauses remains as great as ever. 
III. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES RELATING TO RELIGION 
The effect of the Religion Clauses on juror challenges and 
peremptory challenges in particular must now be assessed.  If it is 
settled that peremptory challenges may not be based upon race or 
sex, as noted at the start, the Supreme Court has yet to decide 
whether they may be based upon or affect religion.  Before 
addressing the effect of the Religion Clauses on this question, 
however, it will be useful to consider the significance of religion from 
the perspective of the “impartial jury” requirement of the Sixth 
Amendment.  As will be recalled, this constitutional provision 
includes both a right to have the petty jury selected at random from a 
fair cross-section of the population and a right not to have present on 
the jury anyone as to whom there is more than a certain likelihood of 
misconduct, the misconduct involved including the use of 
background beliefs about facts or notions of the good other than 
those possessed by some cognizable group.  A cognizable group is a 
group that has distinctive beliefs and is of substantial size.  A religious 
group may or may not be a Sixth Amendment cognizable group: it is 
likely to have distinctive beliefs, but it may or may not be of 
substantial size.  Baptists, for example, would certainly be a 
cognizable group in most American jurisdictions, but Muslims would 
be only in some.  I am assuming here that attention is focused 
exclusively on the Sixth Amendment and that all other constitutional 
provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause and the Religion 
Clauses, are left out of account.  When we come to consider the 
Religion Clauses, size may be irrelevant.  Again, if we restrict 
ourselves to the Sixth Amendment, a group may be a cognizable 
group for that purpose simply by virtue of its size and its distinctive 
beliefs whatever the content of those beliefs, whether founded on 
ideas of the supernatural or limited to secular notions.98  When we 
come to consider other constitutional provisions—the Establishment 
Clause, for instance—the nature of the beliefs the group embraces 
 
 98 Cf. United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (suggesting 
compulsory attendance of Jehovah’s Witness necessary if representative character of 
jury to be met). 
  
462 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:435 
may be all-important. 
The Supreme Court decisions that developed the standard as to 
when it is permissible to exclude from the jury in capital cases those 
who have doubts about capital punishment, decisions earlier referred 
to, provide an example of pure Sixth Amendment analysis.  These 
decisions held that it is permissible to exclude from the jury for cause 
persons whose beliefs would substantially impair their ability to apply 
the law and to limit themselves to the evidence, but that it is 
impermissible to exclude persons simply because they have doubts 
about capital punishment.  To exclude persons in the former group 
enforces the idea of an impartial jury by excluding those as to whom 
there is a significant risk that they will go beyond their assigned role 
as to facts and values.  To exclude those in the latter category would 
be to exclude representatives of a group in the population of 
sufficient size and with distinctive beliefs associated with doubts about 
capital punishment that would constitute a cognizable group for 
Sixth Amendment purposes.  To exclude such persons merely 
because of some risk that they will go beyond permissible beliefs and 
act against the intent of the law would be to deprive the defendant of 
his right to a jury chosen at random from a fair cross-section of the 
population. 
The Supreme Court capital punishment decisions just referred 
to concerned the question of when a person may be excluded from 
the jury for cause.  It is important for our purposes to note that in 
another decision the Supreme Court made clear that even though a 
challenge for cause against a person who is merely doubtful about 
capital punishment may not be sustained, such a person may be 
excluded by a peremptory challenge.99  We have mentioned before 
that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is not considered 
to be violated by peremptory challenges generally, even though their 
exercise interferes with the results of random selection from a fair 
cross-section, and even though they may have the effect of keeping 
off the jury representatives of cognizable groups as to whom there is 
not enough risk of misconduct to justify exclusion for cause.100  That 
the peremptory is based upon religious considerations would not 
seem to affect the validity of this proposition. 
It is surely the case that many people who are opposed to capital 
 
 99 See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987); id. at 671-72 (Powell, J., 
concurring); Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari). 
 100 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1991) (relying on Holland v. Illinois, 493 
U.S. 474 (1990)). 
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punishment or who are doubtful about it base their opposition on 
religious belief.  Yet the question of religion was not discussed in the 
Supreme Court cases just mentioned, which, as stated, were treated as 
pure Sixth Amendment cases.  The decisions were reached without 
any consideration of the possible effect of the Religion Clauses.101  
Criminal defendants who invoked the Sixth Amendment in these 
cases probably had standing also to invoke the free exercise rights of 
dismissed jurors, but these rights were not discussed.  It will be 
recalled from the first part of this Article that criminal defendants are 
allowed to invoke the equal protection rights of excluded jurors. 
If a religious group or the entire group of all believers might or 
might not constitute a cognizable group for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, so it might or might not be a specially protected class 
under the Equal Protection Clause, a class entitled to more than 
simply the requirement of a rational connection between the law in 
question and a permissible governmental objective.  If the whole class 
of religious believers has never been the object of invidious 
discrimination in the United States, the same cannot be said of 
particular religious groups—for instance the Mormons, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, and the Santerias.  Perhaps religious “fundamentalists” or 
even religious “liberals” have had experiences that would qualify as 
invidious discrimination.  Nonbelievers, of course, have sometimes 
been the object of persecution.  Under the Equal Protection Clause, 
as contrasted with the Sixth Amendment, the size of the 
disadvantaged group is irrelevant, except so far as smallness may 
contribute to the group’s being a target of persecution and unable to 
defend itself through the ordinary political process.  Unlike cases of 
race, however, it cannot be said that most cases of religious 
classification have been attended by invidiousness, so that whenever 
there is use of this category, there must be strict or heightened 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.  Recall that at this point 
in our analysis we are disregarding the Religion Clauses.  To demand 
strong justification for a religious classification if there is a showing 
that a particular religious group has been subjected to invidious 
treatment, might pose unmanageable difficulties for the 
administration of constitutional law.102  In any event, although it may 
 
 101 In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), however, the jurors who had 
been unconstitutionally excluded for cause had been removed under a state statute 
that excluded persons who had “conscientious scruples” against capital punishment. 
 102 Investigation into the history and current situation of a multitude of religious 
groups and attitudes toward them might be required.  But see Melissa R. Triedman, 
Note, Extending Batson v. Kentucky to Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges, 4 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 99, 104-05, 115 (1994) (suggesting that such inquiry would not be 
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be analytically satisfying to determine whether a juror challenge on 
the basis of religion should be disallowed under the Equal Protection 
Clause, given that challenges on the basis of race or sex are 
impermissible, the question is largely academic, because when the 
Religion Clauses are taken into account, they preempt the field and 
render an independent discussion of equal protection unnecessary. 
When jury challenges are scrutinized under the Sixth 
Amendment, the interest protected is that of the party who resists the 
challenge—his interest in trial by an “impartial jury.”  When jury 
challenges are scrutinized under the Equal Protection Clause, it has 
come to be accepted, as noted earlier, that the interest primarily 
protected is that of the jurors, an interest in not being excluded from 
an important public function on account of race or sex.  If early 
decisions under the Equal Protection Clause considered the effect on 
the parties, on the atmosphere of the trial, and on the public at 
large,103 recent decisions focus primarily on the rights of the jurors.104  
At the same time, as already mentioned, it is settled that the rights of 
the jurors may be invoked by a party, since otherwise, as a practical 
matter, those rights would not be vindicated. 
Certain preliminaries having been dealt with and necessary 
distinctions made, the time has come to discuss directly the 
applicability of the Free Exercise Clause to challenges to jurors, both 
for cause and peremptory.  In the earlier general discussion of the 
Free Exercise Clause, a distinction was made between those cases that 
must be dealt with under the rule of the Smith case, and those that 
must be dealt with under the Sherbert-Yoder approach.  If a law is a 
neutral law of general applicability, that is the end of the free 
exercise claim so far as the Smith rule is concerned, and no 
consideration need be paid to the importance of the governmental 
interest that the law is designed to uphold.  On the other hand, if the 
law is not a neutral law of general applicability, or it falls within one 
of Smith’s exceptions, there must be a compelling interest to justify it.  
It may seem odd in the case of peremptory challenges to speak of a 
law and to ask whether it is neutral and generally applicable: it would 
be better, perhaps, to speak of an action or decision taken by a party, 
which the Supreme Court has chosen to consider governmental 
action for the purpose of the application of the Bill of Rights and the 
 
required); cf. Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. App. 1987) (involving a 
prosecutor who explained peremptory challenge by saying juror’s religious 
preference—Church of Christ—was “a little bit away from the main stream”). 
 103 E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 104 E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
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Fourteenth Amendment.  In asking whether this action or decision is 
neutral and generally applicable for free exercise purposes, we are 
asking, in part at least, whether there is a reason for it other than one 
concerning religion.  This question could be directed to whether the 
challenge is capable of justification other than on a ground relating 
to religion, or to whether the lawyer making the challenge is actually 
motivated by consideration of religion.  It would be surprising, 
perhaps, to discover that actual motivation is intended, for we are 
accustomed to encountering this concern in connection with the 
Establishment Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause; even in the case 
of the Establishment Clause, the relevance of actual motivation is not 
free from doubt.  In the case of objections to challenges to jurors 
under the Equal Protection Clause on the ground that the challenges 
are based on race or sex, there does indeed seem to be concern with 
what actually motivated the challenging lawyer, although a recent 
Supreme Court decision that directs the trial judge to reject the 
objection if the challenging lawyer, when called upon to explain the 
challenge, states what on its face is a nonracial or nonsexual reason, 
may point in the other direction.105  But the policy of the Smith 
decision, which concededly can be only dimly perceived, possibly can 
be upheld by finding that “neutral [and] generally applicable” looks 
only to whether there is a plausible nonreligious justification for the 
challenge on its face. 
An example of a neutral, generally applicable challenge might 
be a challenge to a juror who is believed to be opposed to abortion.  
Persons opposed to abortion, a prosecutor might think, are less likely 
to sympathize with victims of crime.  Such a view might be held 
regardless of the ideological basis of the opposition to abortion, 
whether it be religious or nonreligious.  The actual motivation of a 
particular challenging prosecutor might correspond to this view: it 
makes no difference to him whether the juror is religious or 
nonreligious; his experience suggests that most persons opposed to 
abortion, regardless of their ideological orientation, are not reliable 
jurors for the prosecution.  Another prosecutor, to the contrary, 
might challenge a juror precisely because he believes the juror’s 
opposition to abortion is religiously based.  The same contrast might 
be found in the capital punishment cases earlier referred to: one 
prosecutor might challenge all those who have difficulty with capital 
punishment; another might challenge only those whose scruples are 
based on religion.106  But even if subjective motivation makes a 
 
 105 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). 
 106 The Court’s opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
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difference under the Equal Protection Clause, should it affect the 
classification of a peremptory challenge as neutral and generally 
applicable for purposes of the Free Exercise Clause and the Smith 
decision? 
Even if a challenge to a juror is neutral and generally applicable 
for Smith purposes, it may come within one of the exceptions set forth 
in Smith, so that the Sherbert-Yoder test will apply.  Might a challenge to 
a juror on religious grounds come within the hybrid exception?  As 
mentioned before in discussing the Smith case itself, it will be rare 
that the practice of religion does not involve speech and association, 
so that a colorable claim cannot also be made under a part of the 
First Amendment other than the Free Exercise Clause.  But the 
exception that seems most likely to be applicable to peremptory 
challenges is the exception in Smith for situations involving 
“individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the 
relevant conduct.”107  Stating this exception, the Court had 
immediately in mind determinations of eligibility for unemployment 
compensation, in order to avoid overruling Sherbert and its line of 
cases.  In the earlier general discussion of the Free Exercise Clause, it 
was suggested that the argument for this individualized assessment 
exception could be that when there is such an assessment, even 
though a nonreligious reason perhaps can be stated for the 
governmental action, there is a significant risk that in practice, 
perhaps over a series of determinations, religion will be 
disadvantaged to a degree that conflicts with the fundamental 
philosophy underlying the Religion Clauses concerning the 
permissible relative effect of governmental action on religion and 
nonreligion.  Readers familiar with the pre-Batson regime of Swain v. 
Alabama,108 under which the Equal Protection Clause would be 
violated by a prosecutor’s peremptories only if there was a pattern or 
practice of racial discrimination over a number of cases, will 
recognize a similar idea at work here.  It may seem strange to attach 
significance to the possibility of an impermissible disadvantaging of 
religion by a series of peremptory challenges if the challenges are 
 
508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993), would characterize this action as “targeting religious 
beliefs.”  Brian Galle, Note, Free Exercise Rights of Capital Jurors, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
569, 578 nn.43, 44 (2001), appreciates the distinction between why a lawyer 
challenges a juror—because he is opposed to abortion or because he is opposed to 
abortion on religious grounds—and what has brought the juror within a challenged 
category.  In other words, the lawyer challenges the juror because he is opposed to 
abortion, but the juror has been brought to his opposition by religious belief. 
 107 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990); see Galle, supra note 106, at 583 (suggesting that even 
challenges for cause may come within the individualized exception). 
 108 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
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made by lawyers for private parties, but this oddity is the result of the 
Court’s insistence that all peremptory challenges are to be attributed 
to the state, at least so far as concerns the applicability of the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court’s response in Smith to the danger posed by 
“individualized assessment” of an impermissible disadvantaging of 
religion is to return to the Sherbert-Yoder requirement of a compelling 
state interest.  An example of a case falling within the individualized 
assessment exception is Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland,109 
where an historic district commission refused to allow a monastery to 
be torn down even though church leaders’ reasons for wanting it 
replaced were concededly religious.  The court held that the 
commission’s determination did not fall under the Smith rule, but 
under the individualized assessment exception.  As in the 
unemployment compensation cases, there was a possibility that over 
time, religion would be impermissibly disadvantaged.  In addition, 
the court determined that the state’s interest in not having the 
monastery torn down was not compelling.110 
It is difficult to think of a situation that falls more comfortably 
into the individualized assessment category—if that is an intelligible 
category—than peremptory challenges.  There is no standard that 
limits the challenger—other than the Constitution.  He is entirely 
free to exercise his judgment on the particulars of the case and the 
individual juror, and even if one prospective juror is indistinguishable 
from another, to make opposite decisions regarding whether to 
challenge.  As with the practice of the historic district commission in 
Keeler, the power of peremptory challenges may be used in such a way 
as to advantage or disadvantage religion over a series of actions. 
If the Smith rule does not apply to peremptory challenges 
because they involve individualized assessments, then the fact that a 
peremptory challenge has a secular purpose, either in the sense that 
a secular explanation for it can be plausibly suggested or in the sense 
that the challenge was in fact motivated by a secular reason—see for 
instance the abortion hypothetical stated above—is not dispositive of 
 
 109 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996). 
 110 In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 
(1994), the Court held that the creation by special act of the state legislature of a 
school district in which all the residents were Satmar Hasidic Jews and which was 
motivated by a desire to help the Satmars to practice their religion, violated the 
Establishment Clause.  This conclusion could be explained by the Court’s fear that 
the use of special acts, rather than general legislation, might lead in practice to 
favoring one religion over others or to impermissibly favoring religion over 
nonreligion.  See id. at 702-05 (1993); see also Julie D. Arp, Note, The Batson Analysis 
and Religious Discrimination, 74 OR. L. REV. 721, 736 (1995). 
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a free exercise claim.  The elimination of the applicability of the 
Smith rule, either because the governmental action is not neutral and 
of general application or because it involves individualized 
assessment, returns us to the familiar terrain of Sherbert-Yoder, where 
the questions are whether there is a burden on religion, and if there 
is, whether there is a compelling state interest to justify it.  In the 
context of peremptory challenges, again employing the abortion 
hypothetical, the question is not simply whether the purpose of the 
challenge was to exclude all persons opposed to abortion regardless 
of the ideological basis for opposition, but whether the exclusion of 
those whose opposition is in fact based upon religion burdens the 
practice of their religion, and if it does, whether the burden is 
justified by a compelling state interest.  Even if a challenge was 
motivated by or is capable of explanation on the basis of a reason that 
has nothing to do with religion, it may burden the religious juror’s 
practice of his religion, because but for his religious belief he would 
not find himself in the class to which the peremptory is directed—
those opposed to abortion.  In this sense the juror’s religion causes 
his exclusion.111 
There can be no doubt that exclusion from a jury on religious 
grounds burdens the practice of religion.  Jury service is an important 
governmental function, both an honor and a responsibility.  That a 
person excluded from a particular jury may be selected for another is 
true: systematic exclusion of members of a religious group from a 
particular kind of case or from all cases—such as was the practice 
with Blacks and women in parts of the country until recently—would 
of course impose a more serious burden.  But the Free Exercise 
Clause is violated if there is any burden, judged from a secular point 
of view.112  It should be kept in mind that although there may be 
 
 111 For a case in which the party who challenged the juror did indeed seem to be 
interested in the ideological basis for the juror’s attitude, see State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 
1055, 1056-57 (Utah 1984).  This was a prosecution for driving while drunk, in which 
jurors who had said they did not drink were not allowed to be asked whether their 
abstention was for personal or religious reasons.  The court held that it was error not 
to allow this question, that an answer might have given reasons for a peremptory 
challenge, and by implication that such a challenge would not have violated a state 
constitutional provision declaring that no one should be considered incompetent to 
be a juror on account of religious belief.  Id. at 1060-61. 
 112 See Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding 
that the burden need not be substantial when religion has been targeted); Arp, supra 
note 110, at 738.  But see WJM ex rel. KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 
1050-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (seeming to require substantial burden); id. at 1053 
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (opining that even a slight burden is sufficient when 
religion is targeted), reh’g denied, 210 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir.) (O’Scannlain, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting the idea that a de minimis violation of Free Exercise Clause is 
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invidious implications in particular instances in which the practice of 
religion is burdened and the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause no 
doubt include the elimination of such invidiousness, invidiousness is 
not a requirement for a violation of the clause. 
As has been noted, the Equal Protection Clause is a violated only 
if there is an impermissible governmental purpose, either in the 
sense of the law’s being incapable of justification except on grounds 
of race or sex or in the sense of actual motivation.  It is not enough 
that the complainant—the excluded juror—has been adversely 
affected.  This is why Batson cases are so taken up with the question of 
what showing there must be of the purpose of the challenge and the 
challenger’s state of mind.113  Under the Establishment Clause, 
equally, there is a requirement of purpose, again in either or both of 
the senses just set forth.  A peremptory challenge could violate the 
Establishment Clause if its purpose was to prefer a particular religion 
over others or to advantage religion over nonreligion to an 
impermissible degree.  But, as we have seen, under the Free Exercise 
Clause, assuming Sherbert-Yoder applies, what is important is not the 
purpose of the governmental action, but its effect. 
Suppose a peremptory challenge is based on the fact that a 
 
permissible), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000).  Although the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act requires a “substantial burden,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000), it is not 
clear that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause itself 
require it.  Although Yoder involved possible criminal punishment, Sherbert concerned 
only loss of an economic benefit.  In any event, if a substantial burden is required, it 
seems clear that the burden must not be judged from a religious point of view—
either that of the particular religion involved or from any other religious point of 
view—but from a secular point of view, in order to avoid courts’ becoming engaged 
in efforts to understand religious doctrine. 
With the burden of exclusion from a jury may be compared the burden of being 
compelled to serve on a jury in violation of one’s religious beliefs.  See In re Jenison, 
125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963) (on remand for reconsideration in light of Sherbert v. 
Verner, holding that under the circumstances, there was no compelling state interest 
to override the free exercise right not to serve); see also United States v. Hillyard, 52 
F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (similar); State v. Everly, 146 S.E.2d 705 (W. Va. 
1966) (similar).  Would a requirement of jury service be a neutral and generally 
applicable law under Smith or would the usual numerous exclusions and exemptions 
deprive it of that character?  Would the requirement fall under either of the 
exceptions to the Smith rule?  Justice Story, on circuit, had a case before him 
involving both the question of whether a juror who had conscientious scruples 
should be required to serve and the question of whether he should be allowed to 
serve, and he ruled that the answer to both questions was no, although without 
referring to any constitutional provisions.  United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650 
(C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868). 
 113 See, e.g., Purkett, 514 U.S. 765; United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 
(3d Cir. 1989). 
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prospective juror is not religious.114  Such a challenge cannot be said 
to be irrational: a lawyer may have experience that nonbelievers are 
more likely to engage in misconduct as jurors or are less likely to be 
favorably disposed to the party he represents than believers.  Such a 
challenge might not violate the Free Exercise Clause—
notwithstanding the puzzle of how religion can be freely exercised if 
the Constitution treats believers more favorably than nonbelievers—
but the Establishment Clause might block such a challenge.  An 
objection to the challenge also could be founded, in the federal 
courts at least, on the provision in Article VI of the original 
Constitution that prohibits religious tests for office,115 and in state 
courts on that same provision if it is made applicable to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.116  However, neither the Establishment 
Clause nor the religious test provision of Article VI may give to the 
unbelieving juror the same protection as the Free Exercise Clause 
gives to believers.  A peremptory challenge on the basis that the juror 
is not religious should be distinguished from one based on the 
absence of any sense of moral obligation (assuming there is such a 
thing as nonreligious morality), which probably may be the basis not 
only for a peremptory challenge, but also for a challenge for cause.117 
Now we must come to weighing the interest in religious liberty 
that would be upheld by forbidding peremptory challenges affecting 
religion against the interest in allowing such challenges.  Although 
the Court strenuously seeks to avoid such a weighing by the Smith 
rule, the task still must be undertaken if a governmental action is not 
neutral and of general applicability or falls within one of the Smith 
exceptions. 
 
 114 Cf. Grady v. State, 730 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. App. 1987), vacated on other 
grounds, 761 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 
 115 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 116 Some state constitutions have no-religious-test provisions and other provisions 
stating that religious opinions shall not render a person incompetent to be a juror.  
In State v. Leuch, 88 P.2d 440, 441-42 (Wash. 1939), the court held that neither sort of 
provision prevented excluding for cause in a capital case a juror who was 
conscientiously opposed to the death penalty in any circumstances.  See Justin Dolan, 
Comment, Thou Shall Not Strike: Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges under the 
Washington State Constitution, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 451 (2001).  In Bader v. State, 40 
S.W.3d 738, 741-43 (Ark.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 826 (2001), the court referred to 
provisions in federal and state constitutions prohibiting religious tests for office, but 
the significance for its holding that there was no error in the circumstances of that 
case in forbidding inquiry into jurors’ religion is unclear.  See also People v. Langston, 
641 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding state constitutional provision prohibiting 
discrimination in civil rights because of religion violated by peremptory challenge to 
Islamic juror). 
 117 Compare the question of the sense of moral obligation required to make a 
person competent to be a witness.  FED. R. EVID. 601, 603. 
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In favor of allowing peremptory challenges based on religion are 
the arguments set forth earlier in favor of peremptory challenges 
generally: they enable the parties to rid the jury of persons who pose 
a significant risk of misconduct, although not enough to justify 
exclusion for cause; they enable the parties to eliminate jurors who, 
although they pose no risk of misconduct, hold views that are 
unfavorable to the challenging party—there being nothing wrong 
with allowing the parties in this context to pursue their own interests 
and, through their combined peremptory challenges, to narrow the 
range of views represented on the jury; and, finally, party 
participation in the formation of the tribunal gives to the 
proceedings something of the character of arbitration, and so 
contributes to the parties’ and the public’s acceptance of the verdict.  
Even if these considerations do not add up to a constitutional right to 
peremptory challenges—and it is settled that no such right exists118—
they may support the argument that there is a strong state interest in 
allowing peremptory challenges. 
In favor of forbidding peremptory challenges affecting religion 
is the importance of respecting and not burdening the practice of 
religion, a value affirmed in Sherbert, Yoder, and other cases.  This 
value, as noted earlier, is independent of any invidiousness that may 
or may not attend exclusion by a peremptory.  As we have seen, 
whereas racial discrimination has usually been accompanied by 
invidiousness, religious discrimination, like sex discrimination, has 
only sometimes been. 
In J.E.B., in support of its decision to forbid sex-based 
peremptories under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court strongly 
condemned what it called “stereotypes” regarding the difference 
between men and women and what they think.  This condemnation 
could be based simply on the ground that these “stereotypes” are 
incorrect or exaggerated and should not for that reason be 
reinforced by governmental recognition.  But this contradicts the 
point of peremptories.  More likely, as suggested earlier, the Court 
condemned “stereotypical” thinking about men and women not 
because it disagreed with the premises, but because in its judgment 
those premises have led to evil social consequences.  But the 
condemnation of stereotypical thinking about religious differences 
and their significance for how believers think and act must be viewed 
from a very different perspective and cannot be invoked as a reason 
for forbidding religion-based peremptories.  Government surely is 
forbidden by the Establishment Clause—and indirectly there would 
 
 118 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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be implications for free exercise as well—from taking and enforcing 
the view that all religions are essentially the same and that being of a 
certain religion should not be seen as having much significance for 
how a person thinks and acts.  Even if there are invidious implications 
in the idea that there are differences and that they matter—for 
instance that those who adhere to a certain religion are in error and 
that their views should be condemned—these implications must be 
accepted for the sake of avoiding the evil effects of a government 
orthodoxy in regard to the supernatural. 
In J.E.B., in determining that sex-based peremptories violated 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court attached significance to what 
it considered the slightness of the predictive value of sex in judging 
how a person will think and act as a juror.119  The same was true in the 
Court’s decisions regarding peremptories based on race.120  The 
slightness of predictive value, the Court thought in J.E.B., 
undermined the claim that such peremptories advanced an 
important state interest.  The likelihood that the challenges would 
keep off the jury a person who would engage in misconduct or who 
even would be unfavorable to the challenging party seemed to the 
Court slight.  Should such a consideration enter into the 
determination of whether there is a compelling state interest in the 
case of religious peremptories?  Some have expressed the view that in 
the case of religion, the predictive value is higher, indeed sufficiently 
higher to justify finding a constitutional difference between racial 
and sexual challenges on the one hand and religious challenges on 
the other.121  In the case of race and sex, the fact upon which 
prediction is based, though not entirely free from difficulties, is 
relatively straightforward: it is a physical fact.  To found a prediction 
on the basis of a person’s religion, however, is to make reference to a 
fact of considerable uncertainty.  Thus a person’s religion may refer 
to something about his state of mind, to his relations with other 
persons or with an institution, to his external behavior, or to his 
cultural inheritance.  Similar uncertainty of reference would attend a 
peremptory challenge based upon “ethnicity.”122  Depending on what 
 
 119 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 138 n.9. 
 120 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 97-98; id. at 104-05 (White, J., concurring). 
 121 For example, Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 492, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1995) (en banc), which held that Batson and J.E.B. did not preclude peremptories 
based on religion—the challenged jurors were members of the Pentecostal Church—
relied on the difference in predictive value between race and sex on the one hand 
and religion on the other and the lack of invidiousness in the case of religion, the 
court suggesting that the greater predictive value eliminated invidiousness. 
 122 See Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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is meant by the religion of the juror, the predictive value of the fact 
could be great or little.  Thus, if a person had said that he had a 
religious belief in a God who saw no value in human law, the 
probability that the person would ignore the law given to him by the 
judge would be considerable, whereas if all that can be said is that the 
juror is a “member” of a particular church, one of whose officials has 
announced such a view as church doctrine, the probability would be 
less.123  So if predictive value is to be considered in assessing the 
strength of the state interest for purposes of Sherbert-Yoder, the specific 
circumstances of each case may have to be considered.  In the case of 
peremptories based on race and sex, the Supreme Court held only 
that peremptories based exclusively on these relatively 
straightforward physical facts violated the Equal Protection Clause.  It 
made clear that if any other circumstances were present to support 
the peremptory—for instance that a particular woman was a member 
of the National Organization for Women—the peremptory might be 
permissible.124  Therefore, in the case of religion it would have to be 
 
 123 In State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 118-22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001), the court held that 
Batson extended to religion, so that a peremptory based on religious “membership” 
or “affiliation” would be unconstitutional.  The court held, however, that the 
peremptory in the litigated case was not of this sort, but was based on the fact that 
the juror had said she was a Catholic, was opposed to capital punishment although 
that would not prevent her from judging the case fairly, and was a secretary for the 
Catholic diocese.  In addition, the bishop, the juror’s employer, had recently stated 
that the Pope was against capital punishment and Catholics should begin to oppose 
it themselves.  The issue for the jury in the case, a first degree murder prosecution, 
was not whether the death penalty should be imposed, nor even whether the 
defendant had killed the victim, but whether the defendant intended or 
premeditated the killing.  State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553-54 (Conn. 1999), is 
similar: although the court held that a peremptory based on “religious affiliation” 
would be unconstitutional, the information the prosecutor relied on in making his 
challenge, which included the juror’s membership in a particular Islamic sect and 
that he had said he would consult his imam if questions arose, took it out of this 
category.  It would appear that the term “religious affiliation” as used in this decision 
implies a small likelihood of misconduct, and that certain connections with a religion 
might constitute more than mere “affiliation.”  See also United States v. DeJesus, 347 
F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2003) (peremptory challenge based on juror’s “heightened 
religious involvement” was not unconstitutional, though challenge based simply on 
denominational affiliation might be); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 
(7th Cir. 1998) (pointing to the necessity of distinguishing between “religious 
affiliation, a religion’s general tenets, and a specific religious belief”); State v. Fuller, 
812 A.2d 389, 397, 406-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (finding no violation of 
state constitutional provision prohibiting discrimination in jury selection on basis of 
principles where prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was based on inference that 
juror dressed in black and wearing a skull cap was probably a Muslim and devout, 
and so likely to be forgiving and defense-oriented; dissent finding violation of both 
state constitution and Free Exercise Clause, the latter not having been considered by 
majority). 
 124 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143-46. 
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decided what about the juror would be equivalent to simply being a 
woman or being of a particular race with its attendant insufficiency of 
predictive value as to how the person would think and act as a juror.  
But perhaps nothing about a juror pertaining to religion would have 
such slight predictive value as to undermine the importance of the 
state interest in allowing religion-related peremptories. 
If the probability of misconduct or unfavorableness should enter 
into the calculation of the state’s interest in religion-related 
peremptories, a form of misconduct peculiar to these cases must be 
attended to.  Although it involved exclusion from the legislature and 
not from a jury and could be seen as analogous to exclusion for cause 
rather than by peremptory, McDaniel v. Paty125 brings out this point.  
In McDaniel a state constitution rendered ineligible for office either 
in the legislature or in state constitutional conventions, ministers of 
religion.  A number of different objectives could have been served by 
this exclusion.  First, it could have been based upon the idea that 
involvement of ministers in government and politics conflicts with 
their sacred character and function.  The value upheld would be 
strictly religious.  It is clear that such an objective would violate the 
Establishment Clause: it embraces a particular idea of religion and 
religious leadership and seeks to protect that idea.  A second purpose 
of the exclusion could have been to create circumstances that would 
make more likely full-time devotion to the ministry by those who 
undertake it, the function of a minister being deemed of great 
importance.  This objective does not imply any view of the deleterious 
effect of mixing religion with politics.  An Establishment Clause 
objection concerning undue support of religion might be answered 
by also excluding from the legislature persons in other occupations 
also considered important, for instance police, firemen, and 
members of the Armed Forces.  A third purpose could have been 
related to the effective working of the legislature itself, rather than to 
the protection of religion.  Experience might suggest that ministers 
with competing responsibilities and great demands on their time 
cannot be responsible and effective legislators.  But if that is the 
argument, it needs to be explained why other classes of busy persons, 
such as doctors and lawyers, do not pose the same danger.  Finally—
and this is the point in which we are chiefly interested—ministers of 
religion in the legislature pose a special risk—or at least so the 
adopters of the state constitutional provision might have thought—of 
enacting legislation that violates the Establishment Clause, either 
 
 125 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).  Purcell, 18 P.3d at 121, cites McDaniel 
and suggests its relevance to religion-based peremptories. 
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because it is incapable of justification on a secular ground or because 
it was subjectively motivated by religious belief.126  Laymen also may 
pose a risk of such an occurrence, but it would be a smaller risk. 
In McDaniel the Court struck down the exclusion of ministers 
from the legislature on the ground that it violated the free exercise 
right of the minister: he must not be required to choose between the 
ministry and being a legislator; the restriction imposed an 
impermissible burden on the pursuit of his religious vocation.  
Although the Court did not mention it, the minister’s interest might 
have been coupled with the interest of his parishoners in having him 
as their minister, if they had no objection to his also being a 
legislator.  Indeed, they might have thought this combination a 
perfectly appropriate exercise of his ministry.  What is clear from the 
Supreme Court’s decision is that the minister’s and perhaps the 
congregation’s interests in religious liberty outweighed the risk of 
conduct by the minister in the legislature that would violate the 
Establishment Clause.127 
As mentioned, McDaniel involved what was analogous to some 
exclusions for cause in the jury context: the minister was excluded by 
virtue of a per se rule addressed to a class of persons.  Might the 
Supreme Court have reached a different result if exclusion followed 
an individualized determination of the risk posed by a particular 
person to Establishment Clause values?  In any case, two questions are 
presented of interest to our inquiry: What is the relevance of 
McDaniel’s exclusion from the legislature to exclusion from a jury; 
and what is the relevance of constitutional limits on challenges for 
cause to peremptory challenges? 
Grounds for disqualification from the legislature must be 
pertinent to the legislature’s distinctive functions: determining social 
policy and laying down general rules.  In gathering information to 
enable it to discharge these functions, the legislature may proceed in 
any way it sees fit.  Legislators, not being drawn at random from a 
representative cross-section of the population, are not restricted, as 
 
 126 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 
97 (1968). 
 127 With exclusion of a minister from the legislature, compare La Rocca v. Lane, 
338 N.E.2d 606 (N.Y. 1975), in which a prohibition against a Catholic priest-lawyer 
wearing his clerical collar while representing a client in a criminal jury trial was 
upheld against a free exercise claim made by the priest-lawyer, who said his priestly 
vocation required him to wear the collar.  The fear was not that the priest-lawyer 
would act in some way inconsistent with his duties as a lawyer, but that the jurors, 
seeing the collar, would respond in an improper way.  If exclusion of a priest from a 
jury, simply because he is a priest would violate McDaniel, what about forbidding him 
to wear his collar or tell the other jurors that he is a priest? 
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jurors are, to background information possessed by some section of 
the population of substantial size.  In regard to matters of value, the 
legislature may embrace any values it sees fit within constitutional 
limits.  It does not take the law from any other authority.  The 
particular constitutional limit of concern in the present connection, 
although not mentioned by the Court in McDaniel, is the 
Establishment Clause.  In this perspective, the very special nature of 
the Establishment Clause stands forth.  It alone of all constitutional 
provisions limits the nature of the good that the legislature may 
pursue: it may not pursue a transcendent or supernatural good.  
Likewise, legislation may not be premised on factual beliefs about the 
transcendent or supernatural.  As earlier noted, it is not clear 
whether this means only that legislation that is enacted must be 
reasonably capable of secular justification, or whether in addition it 
means that legislation must not have been actually motivated by 
religious belief. 
Exclusion from a jury will be either for cause or as a result of the 
exercise of a peremptory challenge.  Exclusion for cause may be by 
virtue of a per se rule created by the legislature or developed by the 
courts, or by the application of a burden of proof rule to the 
likelihood of misconduct suggested by the information available 
regarding a particular juror.  Misconduct by jurors, the risk of which 
may justify exclusion for cause, as is the case with legislators, may 
relate either to beliefs about the good or factual beliefs.  As observed 
earlier, the role of the jury in regard to values is much more limited 
than that of the legislature: generally, the jury must take the law from 
the judge.  In regard to those few situations in which jurors may apply 
ideas of the good, they probably must limit themselves to ideas they 
believe are held by a section of the population of substantial size.128  
In regard to the facts, the jurors must learn of these through the 
formal trial process, subject to the Rules of Evidence, or from 
background information held by a section of the population of 
substantial size.  Thus, the risk of misconduct generally is greater in 
the case of jurors than legislators, although this may not be so in the 
case of the particular misconduct of a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.  If the limit of the Establishment Clause is imposed on the 
 
 128 The distinction between the functions of the legislature and juries, with 
particular reference to peremptory challenges, was noted by Justice Souter in his 
dissent in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1051 n.5 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Souter wrote that the legislature is concerned with social values, whereas the jury is 
concerned to apply law to a set of objectively discovered facts.  See Eric L. Muller, 
Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 
106 YALE L.J. 93, 148 (1996). 
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legislature, it is impossible to think why it should not also be imposed 
on the jury.  Both exercise governmental power under the 
Constitution.  Thus the jury in exercising its function must not resort 
to beliefs about the transcendent or the supernatural, either in 
regard to the good or the true. 
If the foregoing proposition is correct, the decision in State v. De 
Mille129 is wrong.  In that case, on a motion for a new trial, the trial 
court refused to receive a juror’s affidavit that in the course of jury 
deliberations, a juror had stated that during closing argument she 
had prayed for a sign concerning defendant’s guilt, had received a 
revelation that if defense counsel did not make eye-contact with her 
that would indicate guilt, and that he had not made eye-contact.  The 
appellate court held that there was no error and even suggested that 
a contrary result might violate a provision in the state constitution 
protecting the rights of conscience and prohibiting religious tests for 
office.130 
Jurors may not bring to bear religious beliefs even though they 
are confident that the beliefs are held by a group of substantial size in 
the population, perhaps even by a majority.  Thus the fair cross-
section standard of the Sixth Amendment is limited by the 
Establishment Clause.131  Furthermore, if in the case of the legislature 
 
 129 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988). 
 130 The court further stated that if “a juror might so abandon his or her judgment 
to what he or she perceives to be oracular signs as to be unable to fairly consider the 
evidence and properly apply the law,” the case might be different.  Id. at 84.  A 
different interpretation of the court’s decision might be that whether or not it is 
proper for jurors to be guided by revelations, the rule that jurors’ statements will not 
be admitted to impeach a verdict, UTAH R. EVID. 606(b) and FED. R. EVID. 606(b), 
precluded evidence of such an event.  The dissent was based not on the 
Establishment Clause, but on the right to jury trial.  See People v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d 
1044, 1105 (Cal. 2000) (holding that neither the First nor Sixth Amendment was 
violated by excluding for cause a juror who believed that a bubble of light 
surrounded each person and would protect him, and who also believed that he could 
not predict the influence of his “inner voice” on his deliberations as a juror; the trial 
court had a “reasonable concern that the prospective juror’s mysticism and other 
observable characteristics would impair his ability—as an individual—to deliberate 
rationally”), modified, reh’g denied, No. S007522, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 5222 (Cal. June 28, 
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1151 (2001); see also Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765 
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 847, 943 (2001) (holding there to be a violation 
of Establishment Clause for prosecutor in closing argument of penalty phase of 
capital case to tell jurors that God ordains authority and that in imposing death 
penalty they would be doing what God says). 
 131 In State v. Rogers, 825 S.W.2d 49, 51-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992), defendant 
contended that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by 
the fact the venires were composed from lists of persons with drivers’ licenses and 
that the Amish, a substantial portion of the local population, did not drive.  Were the 
Amish a Sixth Amendment cognizable group?  Their religious beliefs could not 
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it is not enough that the results of its activity be capable of secular 
justification, but that the activity also must actually be motivated by 
secular considerations, it is difficult to see why the same requirement 
would not apply to the jury. 
In McDaniel, one of the reasons for excluding ministers from the 
legislature, as already mentioned, could have been extrinsic to the 
legislative process: to preserve the ministers’ sacred function.  Other 
exclusions for extrinsic policy reasons can be found or may be 
imagined, for instance in the case of members of the Armed Forces 
or the police. But even if it is permissible to pursue these other 
objectives through exclusion—and it may not be, considering the 
voters’ interest in having the representatives they want—it is not 
permissible to pursue the policy implied by the exclusion of ministers 
because of the Establishment Clause: exclusion would uphold a 
particular religious idea.  If that objective may not be pursued 
through exclusion from the legislature, neither may it be pursued 
through exclusion from a jury. 
Exclusion in either context for a reason intrinsic to the 
governmental function involved, namely a risk of a violation of the 
Establishment Clause, presents a different question, however.  But 
McDaniel teaches that this danger is not sufficient to warrant 
exclusion of ministers from the legislature in the face of the Free 
Exercise Clause.  Even more clearly, exclusion of a wider class, say of 
all believers, would violate the Free Exercise Clause and perhaps the 
no-religious-test provision of Article VI, although with the members 
of this class also there may be a risk of recourse to beliefs in the 
supernatural.  Elimination of the risk does not justify the cost.  
Exclusion of nonbelievers probably would be blocked by the 
Establishment Clause and the no-religious-test provision.  But in the 
case of both the legislature and the jury, it is conceivable that there 
could be a situation in which a class of persons or a particular person 
could be excluded, because the group or individual held particular 
religious beliefs that created a great danger of unconstitutional 
behavior.  It will be recalled that the Supreme Court in the 
Witherspoon-Witt line of cases relating to capital punishment,132 held 
 
qualify them as such because of the Establishment Clause.  Might they be a 
cognizable group by virtue of their knowledge of farming and related rural activities?  
But would they know things that non-Amish farmers do not?  Might the Amish be a 
specially protected class under the Equal Protection Clause?  Might the free exercise 
rights of the Amish be violated by the use in forming jury pools of lists of those who 
engage in activities the Amish religion forbids them to engage in, even though the 
use of these lists was not for the purpose of excluding them? 
 132 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 
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that jurors whose beliefs would substantially impair their ability to 
consider the evidence and apply the law could be excluded from the 
jury for cause.  Presumably this would include jurors whose 
opposition was based on religious belief.133  In extreme cases, the 
Establishment Clause might require, not simply permit, a person or 
class of persons to be excluded.  Thus, in certain situations the 
ordinary law of exclusion for cause might not measure up to 
constitutional requirements. 
Miles v. United States134 involved the question of whether 
Mormons who believed in bigamy could be disqualified for cause in 
the trial of a prosecution for bigamy.  The Supreme Court’s decision 
was handed down shortly after its ruling in the famous case of 
Reynolds v. United States, in which a criminal conviction for practicing 
bigamy was held not to violate the Free Exercise Clause.135  The trial 
court had disqualified two jurors, one who said he believed that 
bigamy was an ordinance of God and that persons who practiced it 
should not be convicted, and another who said he also believed that 
bigamy was an ordinance of God and that the statute that prohibited 
it was in conflict with that ordinance, but that Congress had a right to 
pass such a law and that he would consider it his duty, if satisfied by 
the evidence, to find the defendant guilty.136  The Supreme Court 
sustained both of the lower court’s rulings and did so in sweeping 
language suggesting that the mere holding of a belief that bigamy was 
an ordinance of God justified exclusion for cause and that the fact 
that religious belief was involved was irrelevant.137  It seems clear that 
an expressed intention to use the position of juror to defeat the law 
warrants exclusion for cause even though the motivation is religious.  
As to the second juror in Miles, who said he believed in polygamy but 
would do his civic duty nevertheless, there may be more question.  
Might there be a conflict here with the Witherspoon-Witt line of cases, 
which held that jurors who had some scruples about capital 
punishment could not be excluded for cause?  Of course those 
decisions addressed the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
random selection from a fair cross-section.  In Miles it is not clear 
whether the Court intended to address such a claim.  It did, however, 
 
(1968). 
 133 See State v. Davis, 386 S.E.2d 418, 427 (N.C. 1989) (holding exclusion for cause 
of juror opposed to capital punishment on religious grounds was not violative of free 
exercise rights); State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tenn. 1987) (same). 
 134 103 U.S. 304 (1880). 
 135 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 136 Miles, 103 U.S. at 306-07. 
 137 Id. at 310. 
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expressly reject the contention that the free exercise rights of the 
excluded juror had been violated, even though possibly there was 
only a modest likelihood that the second juror would engage in 
misconduct.  Miles, however, like Reynolds, is an old decision, handed 
down long before the modern development of free exercise 
jurisprudence, and so without much authority.138 
Earlier it was said that McDaniel suggested two questions 
pertinent to our subject, first, the relevance of exclusion from the 
legislature to exclusion from a jury, and second, the relevance of 
exclusion for cause to exclusion by peremptory challenge.  I now 
address the second question.  In the case of challenges for cause, the 
parties invoke a rule of law based upon the law’s judgment of an 
unacceptable risk of misconduct.  The number of challenges for 
cause that may be upheld is unlimited.  In the case of peremptories, 
there is no rule of law except that the party’s decision must be 
honored.  The party makes an entirely discretionary determination, 
on the basis of the information he has, about what is an unacceptable 
risk of misconduct or how best his interests will be served.  The 
number of peremptories is limited.  Thus peremptory challenges 
have a different structure and serve different purposes than 
challenges for cause.  Obviously if a challenge for cause would be 
sustained, a fortiori a peremptory challenge must be.  It does not 
follow, however, that if a challenge for cause would not be sustained, 
a peremptory is not permissible.  As applied to the question of 
present concern, even if it is settled that under certain circumstances 
the free exercise rights of the juror would block a challenge for 
cause, that does not mean that a peremptory challenge must be 
prohibited. 
A return to the Witherspoon-Witt line of capital punishment cases 
provides an opportunity to summarize what has just been said and to 
situate it in the larger picture.  As will be recalled, under Witherspoon-
Witt, jurors whose attitude toward capital punishment creates a 
substantial risk that they will not apply the law or heed the evidence 
may be excluded for cause.  Their exclusion does not violate the fair 
cross-section value of the Sixth Amendment; indeed, it can be argued 
that it enforces it because of the high probability of misconduct.  
 
 138 Reynolds also involved challenges to jurors, but the challenges were based upon 
the excluded jurors themselves being polygamists, not simply on their holding 
opinions about polygamy.  Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 157.  Compare Miles, 103 U.S. 304, with 
Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 953-54 (D.C. 1977) (in prosecution for 
robbery of priests in Catholic rectory, holding it was not error to refuse to exclude 
for cause all Catholics).  If “Catholics” could be excluded, who would fall within the 
excluded class? 
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These cases did not present a free exercise claim, but even if they 
had, it probably would have been overridden by the compelling state 
interest in preventing nullification of the law, even though the 
interest in the free exercise of religion and the fair cross-section value 
of the Sixth Amendment may not be of exactly the same weight.  On 
the other hand, under Witherspoon-Witt, jurors who are merely 
doubtful about capital punishment may not be excluded for cause.  
The risk of misconduct is not sufficient to justify encroachment upon 
the fair cross-section value.  This was the holding of Witherspoon itself.  
Because the decision rested upon the Sixth Amendment, there was 
no reason to reach a free exercise claim that might have been made 
by jurors whose doubts had their origins in religious belief. 
Although a juror merely doubtful about capital punishment may 
not be excluded for cause, he may be excluded by a peremptory.  The 
characteristics of the peremptory challenge that have been outlined 
above, which distinguish it from the challenge for cause, are enough 
to justify such compromising of the cross-section value as may occur.  
In making this point, it is assumed that the doubting jurors are a 
cognizable group for Sixth Amendment purposes.  Suppose now, in 
addition, doubting jurors whose doubts rest upon religious belief 
invoke their free exercise right with the purpose of preventing their 
exclusion by peremptories.  This right does not require that they 
represent a cognizable group under the Sixth Amendment.  They 
claim that even though the virtues of a peremptory challenge are 
enough to outweigh the Sixth Amendment value, these virtues are 
not enough to outweigh the interest in the free exercise of religion. 
It is now necessary to review what has been said and to take a 
position on the permissibility of religion-based peremptories under 
the Free Exercise Clause, assuming that the Sherbert-Yoder test is 
applicable.  Undoubtedly, exclusion from a jury on account of 
religion imposes a burden on the practice of religion.  The strength 
of the First Amendment right not to have the practice of religion 
burdened is indicated by the Sherbert-Yoder requirement of a 
compelling state interest.  Do the policies that support the allowance 
of peremptory challenges constitute such an interest?  These policies 
have already been set forth: eliminating from the jury persons who 
pose a risk of misconduct, although not a sufficient risk to support a 
challenge for cause; allowing the parties to excuse a limited number 
of jurors whom they consider unfavorably disposed towards them; 
and allowing the parties to participate in the formation of the 
tribunal, so as to make acceptance of the verdict more likely.  That 
there is no federal constitutional right to any peremptories at all does 
not mean that if the legislature chooses to allow peremptories, the 
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reasons for them do not add up to a substantial state interest. 
In the case of race, the reasons for peremptories do not add up 
to a state interest weighty enough to justify excluding a juror on that 
basis.  How then could they be found sufficient to constitute a 
compelling state interest that would overcome the right to the free 
exercise of religion?  One might argue that a reason for reaching 
different results in the two situations is not that there is any 
difference in the policies supporting peremptories, but that the 
substantive constitutional rights have different importance: the 
constitutional commitment to abolish racial discrimination is 
stronger than the commitment to the free exercise of religion.139  Put 
thus baldly, the proposition is impossible to accept. 
If it is argued that the effect of Smith has been to devalue the 
right to the free exercise of religion with the consequence that it 
should be given less protection than the right to be free from racial 
discrimination, that would implicitly abolish the exceptions to the 
Smith rule, under one of which—individualized consideration—it has 
been assumed peremptory challenges should be located. 
Even if ending racial discrimination is of supreme importance, 
how can allowing religion-based peremptories be squared with not 
allowing peremptories based on sex under the Equal Protection 
Clause?  Discrimination based on sex requires not a compelling, but 
only a very persuasive state interest to justify it.  Yet in J.E.B., the 
Court held that the policies supporting peremptories did not even 
reach that mark.140  Surely it will not be argued that though the 
strength of the policies for peremptories remains the same, the 
substantive right to be free from sex discrimination is more powerful 
than the right to the free exercise of religion, a right expressly set 
forth in the First Amendment.  The ideas about sex discrimination in 
J.E.B. are relatively recent developments in equal protection law, 
whereas the struggle over race discrimination has marked the 
nation’s entire history, and since the Civil War has generated the 
 
 139 Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 140 J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127; id. at 146-47 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The State’s 
proferred justifications for its gender-based peremptory challenges are far from the 
‘exceedingly persuasive’ showing required to sustain a gender-based classification.”); 
see Casarez, 913 S.W.2d at 502 (Baird, J., dissenting) (pointing out the difficulty of 
reconciling the court’s decision in that case with J.E.B.); see also Hodge, 726 A.2d at 
552 (finding J.E.B. not distinguishable); Angela J. Mason, Note, Discrimination Based 
on Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in the Peremptory Challenge’s Coffin?, 29 GA. L. REV. 
493, 523-25 (1995) (stating that in view of decisions regarding race and sex, the 
Court has little choice but to disallow peremptory challenges based on religion); Arp, 
supra note 110, at 738-39 (same).  But see Chambers, supra note 5, at 592-99. 
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strongest legal condemnations.141 
I have already pointed out a feature of peremptory challenges 
based on religion that distinguishes them from challenges based on 
race and sex.  Whereas it is tolerably clear what is meant by a juror’s 
race or sex, it is not at all clear what is meant by a juror’s religion.  
The significance of this difference lies in its bearing on the predictive 
value for juror misconduct or unfavorableness of the fact upon which 
the challenge is premised: organizational affiliation may have little 
predictive value, but regular attendance at worship or personal 
statements of belief may have considerable.  This consideration does 
not alter the importance attached to the policies that support 
peremptories, but it points to circumstances that affect the degree to 
which those policies will be defeated by the disallowance of a 
peremptory.  If it is assumed, however, that the predictive value of the 
fact concerning religion is the same as the predictive value of race or 
sex, how can a peremptory challenge based on sex be disallowed, but 
a peremptory challenge based on religion allowed, without holding 
that the right to free exercise is less weighty than the right to be free 
from sex discrimination? 
In the foregoing I have been comparing the importance of the 
right of free exercise with the rights to be free from racial and sexual 
discrimination, and asking how the latter can be recognized but not 
the former.  But there is another perspective that must be taken into 
account before closing, a perspective characteristically associated with 
the Religion Clauses and which has been referred to already several 
times in this Article: the standard embodied in the Religion Clauses 
regarding the permissible relative effect of government action on the 
positions of religion and nonreligion.  It is one thing to consider 
separately and then compare the strength of the rights to be free 
from racial and sexual discrimination and the right to religious 
freedom and to weigh these against the arguments in favor of 
peremptories.  But it has been settled by the Court that the 
Constitution forbids peremptories based on race and sex.  Even 
assuming that the Free Exercise Clause allows religion-based 
peremptories in cases where all other peremptories are allowed, since 
the Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the use 
of some nonreligion-based peremptories—race and sex—then 
 
 141 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 155 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (distinguishing 
disallowance of racial from sexual peremptories, in part on ground that “racial 
equality has proved a more challenging goal to achieve on many fronts than gender 
equality”); Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting in denial 
of certiorari) (contending that the decision in J.E.B. requires disallowance of 
religion-based peremptories). 
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perhaps the norm embodied in the Religion Clauses, which says that 
if certain advantages are given to nonreligion they must also be given 
to religion, requires that religion-based peremptories be disallowed.  
The Court has given us an equal protection jurisprudence that is not 
“neutral [and] generally applicable,” with the consequence that the 
Free Exercise Clause, read against this background, requires that 
religion be similarly protected.142 
 
 
 142 If religion-based peremptories are held to be constitutionally impermissible, 
what of those based upon expressions of political opinion or other speech, or upon 
membership in nonreligious associations?  United States v. Villareal, 963 F.2d 725, 728-
29 (5th Cir. 1992), a pre J.E.B. case, refused to disallow such peremptories.  (The 
juror had made statements indicating opposition to capital punishment.)  See Casarez, 
913 S.W.2d at 492, 495; id. at 498 (Mansfield, J., concurring) (expressing concern 
with the implications of disallowing religion-based peremptories for the status of 
peremptories based on political speech and association); see also Cheryl G. Bader, 
Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory Challenges That Violate a 
Prospective Juror’s Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 567 (1996). 
